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WILL LAW FIRMS GO PUBLIC?
ROBERTA S. KARMEL*
Law in the United States is a big business and big law firms
(Big Law) are a global business. The legal profession has evolved
from solo practitioners and small general partnerships, practicing
primarily in a single state and regulated by the courts of that state,
to a more complicated and segmented industry, ranging from
traditional small partnerships to giant multi-state and multicountry organizations. Yet in the current Great Recession, Big Law
is under serious economic stress, epitomized by the bankruptcy of
the venerable Dewey & LeBoeuf firm.1 In addition, the high cost of
legal services has led to a lack of affordable representation for
many individuals and small businesses.
These developments have led to two related questions: should
law firms be allowed to accept equity capital from nonlawyers; and
should lawyers be allowed to practice in firms with nonlawyers.
These questions have been percolating for a number of years, and
have been under consideration by the American Bar Association's
(ABA) Commission on Ethics 20/20 (Ethics Commission). 2
* Roberta S. Karmel is Centennial Professor of Law and Co-Director of the
Dennis J. Block Center for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn
Law School. She is a former Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. A summer research grant from Brooklyn Law School was of
assistance in the preparation of this article. The author gratefully acknowledges
the research assistance of Brooklyn Law School Students Michael Russo, Margaret
Corchado, and Michael Tse. The author thanks her colleagues Professors Anita
Bernstein, Cynthia Godsoe, and Nelson Tebbe for their helpful comments and
members of the faculty of Touro Law School, where she delivered this article at a
Colloquium.
1 See James B. Stewart, Dewey's Fall Underscores Law Firms' New Reality, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 5, 2012, at B1 (highlighting the fiscal pressures Big Law firms
currently face leading to the failure of once respected firms).
2 James Podgers, Ethics 20/20 Commission Seeks Input on Alternative Business
Structures for Law Firms, ABA JOURNAL (Apr. 5, 2011, 1:53 PM). http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/ethics-20_20 commissionseeks-input on
alternative_ business structures for law firms.
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Although the Ethics Commission has now decided not to propose
changes to ABA policy on nonlawyer ownership of law firms, 3 this
non-decision will not end debate about how to finance the law
business. This is in part because the United Kingdom, Australia,
and other jurisdictions have already changed their regulatory
frameworks for lawyers to allow the infusion of outside capital
into law firms, 4 and Big Law will find global competitive pressures
to expand and compete with U.K. and Australian firms difficult to
resist. In addition, charges that legal ethics rules preventing law
firms from experimenting with different types of business
organizations are anti-competitive are likely to persist and receive
a sympathetic hearing in some quarters, and possibly some courts.
The American Lawyer has been tracking the growth of Big Law
for a quarter of a century. During that time, the total gross
revenues of the 100 largest firms (Am Law 100) have multiplied
from $7 billion to $71 billion.5 Yet, there have been significant
changes in the law firm model and the identity of the firms in the
Am Law 100. Growth has come largely from the movement of
lateral partners, and eleven of the 1986 top twenty are no longer in
the top twenty. 6 Nevertheless, seven of the firms on the 1986 list
increased their revenues per lawyer by 300% or more, and thirteen
increased their revenues per lawyer by over 250%.7 This growth
far exceeded the growth of other income earners in the United
States, where per capita GDP grew only at an annualized rate of
3.9%.8 Further, although this growth had been slowing since 2008,
in 2011 gross revenue, revenue per lawyer, and profits per partner

3 James Podgers, Summer Job: Ethics 20/20 Commission Shelves Nonlawyer
Ownership, Focuses on Other Proposals, ABA JOURNAL (June 1, 2012, 2:50 AM),
http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/summer-job-ethics_2020commission shelves nonlawyer-ownership.
4 Erin J. Cox, An Economic Crisis Is a Terrible Thing to Waste: Reforming the
Business of Law for a Sustainable and Competitive Future, 57 UCLA L. REv. 511, 53337 (2009).
5 Michael D. Goldhaber, The Long Run, AM. LAW. (Apr. 27, 2012), http://
www.americanlawyer. com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202549688718.
6 Id.
7 Amy Kolz, Myth Busters, AM. LAW. (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.
americanlawyer.com/id=1202549688935/Myth-Busters.

8 Id.
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all rose by single digit percentages for the Am Law 100.9 Four
firms had 2011 gross revenues in excess of $2 billion, and another
thirteen firms had gross revenues in excess of $1 billion.10 Also,
twenty-two firms employed over 1,000 lawyers; five over 2,000.11
This continued growth of Big Law should be counterbalanced
against the decline in the profitability of the legal profession
generally. In 2007 and 2008, the legal services sector shed 40,000
jobs.12 Further, a number of large firms collapsed into bankruptcy
or closed their doors. 13 One lesson of these failures was that
financing through bank debt was problematic, and so some law
firms have turned to third party funding in the form of hedge fund
investment in litigation.14
This Article will argue that, even if law firms retain the form of
partnerships, they eventually will accept investments from third
parties, and possibly even go public. However, this development
could lead to a loss of professionalism, as it has with other
industries, and could also lead to the end of self-regulation. While
the changes that are coming to the legal profession are being and
will continue to be resisted, for both good and bad reasons, it
would be wise for the bar to think through what kind of regulation
would best serve clients, the public, and the profession in the
future. This Article will discuss (in Part 1) legal ethics rules
regarding law firm organization and the work of the Ethics
Commission; (in Part 2) the changes to the regulation of lawyers in
England, Australia, and elsewhere; (in Part 3) litigation attacking
current ethics rules regarding outside investments in law firms; (in
Part 4) the evolution of other industries from closely held
partnerships or mutual organizations to large public companies,
specifically investment banking and stock exchanges; and (in Part
5) the future of the legal profession.

9 The Am Law 100: Firms Ranked by Gross Revenue 2012, AM. LAW.,
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202549382505
(last
visited Feb. 28, 2014).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12

Cox, supra note 4, at 517. This figure includes support staff.

13 Id. at 520-22.
14

Id. at 524-25.
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RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

1.1. American Bar Association Rules
ABA Model Rule 5.4 provides that, "[a] lawyer or law firm
shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer," and "shall not form a
partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the
partnership consist of the practice of law." 15 Similarly, Rule 5.4 of
the New York Rules of Professional Conduct provides that "[a]
lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer" and
"[a] lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of an entity
authorized to practice law for profit, if: a nonlawyer owns any
interest therein." 16 These bans on multidisciplinary practice and
nonlawyer ownership of law firm partnership interests are of long
standing.
The American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers similarly provides:
(1) A nonlawyer may not own any interest in a law firm,
and a nonlawyer may not be empowered to or actually
direct or control the professional activities of a lawyer in
the firm. (2) A lawyer may not form a partnership or other
business enterprise with a nonlawyer if any of the activities
of the enterprise consist of the practice of law.17
Rule 5.4 is a standard promulgated by the ABA, and the ABA is
a voluntary bar association. It is not a government agency, and it
does not have delegated governmental authority.1 8 It is more like a
trade association than a self-regulatory organization, and not all
lawyers belong to the ABA. However, state bar associations and
courts have incorporated this standard into their disciplinary rules,
although not all states have done so uniformly.

15 MODEL

RULES

OF

PROF'L

CONDUCT

R.

5.4

(1983),

available

at

http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/
model rules..of..professional conduct/rule_5_4_professional independence of a
lawyer.html.
16 N.Y.

RULES

OF

PROF'L

CONDUCT

R.

5.4

(2009),

available

at

www.nycla.org/siteFiles/NYRulesofProfessionalConduct4l09_362.pdf.
17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 10.1-.2 (2000).
18 Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. Law Sch., 943 N.Y.S. 2d 834, 842 n.4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2012).
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The prohibitions against multidisciplinary practices and
nonlawyer investments in law firms have been justified as
necessary to preserve independence and professionalism, to avoid
conflicts of interest, and to preserve a lawyer's duties to clients,
especially the duty of confidentiality, and to the courts.19
Nevertheless, these bans are also anti-competitive. They stand in
the way of the provision of low cost legal services in certain areas
susceptible to commoditization, and they prevent clients from
obtaining combined
services from lawyers and other
professionals. 20 This is because the bans prevent firms from
reaching an optimum size for the provision of higher quality and
lower priced services, and to compete with nonlawyer
organizations. Further, lawyers are unable to realize the present
economic value of their reputations through the sale of stock or
other ownership interests. 21 The basic concern animating the ethics
rules is that permitting nonlawyer ownership or direction would
subject lawyers to meeting the goals of the nonlawyers rather than
meeting their duties to clients.22 In other words, business pressures
would trump professionalism.
The organized bar has feared that, on one hand, large
accounting firms would combine with law firms, 23 and on the
other, that Walmart could provide legal services to customers. 24
But these realistic fears are not an adequate basis for preserving
ethics rules that prevent law firms from obtaining capital for
expansion, investment in new technologies, financing of
contingency fee cases, or other experiments in the delivery of legal
services.2 5 If these ethics rules are to be preserved, they need to be
19 Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1, 15 (2012).
20 See id. at 16 (arguing that the lack of competition results in higher legal
costs for the general public, thus harming the public instead of protecting them).
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 10 cmt. c (2000).
22 Id.
23 See Sydney M. Cone, III, International Legal Practice Involving England and
New York Following Adoption of United Kingdom Legal Services Act of 2007, 28 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 415, 416-17 (2008) (noting that the fear of such developments was
pervasive at the time of the adoption of these rules following such partnership
activity between law firms and large accounting firms in France).
24 See Knake, supra note 19, at 37-40 (providing successful examples of retail
legal operations in the United Kingdom feared by the organized bar).
25 See Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?:A
Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40 (1998)
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justified as necessary to maintain the independence and
Although this may be a valid
professionalism of lawyers.
justification, in view of the existing shift of the legal profession
from a profession to a business, the public distrust of lawyers, and
client dissatisfaction with the cost of legal services, the professional
values protected by current ethics rules needs to be spelled out.
Unfortunately, for many years the ABA has neither articulated
why the ethics rules should be preserved, nor proposed changes to
the rules. In 1998, the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice (MDP Commission) was created and began to study and
report on the extent to which U.S. lawyers and law firms should be
allowed to enter into "alternative law practice structures in which
nonlawyers have an ownership interest" and "whether such
practices could operate in a manner that is consistent with the
American legal profession's core values." 2 6 The impetus for the
work of the MDP Commission was that the large accounting firms
had consulting practices that performed work similar to the
provision of legal services.2 7 One year after its creation, the MDP
Commission issued a report to the ABA House of Delegates
recommending that the ABA ethics rules be changed to permit
multidisciplinary practices conditioned on safeguards to ensure
that the core values of the legal profession be maintained. 28
However, the ABA House of Delegates rejected the
recommendation and resolved not to change or amend the Model
Rules to allow lawyers to offer legal services through
multidisciplinary practices "until additional study demonstrates

(concluding that on balance, the benefits of lifting the restrictions on nonlawyer
investment in law firms outweigh the harms, and therefore they must be lifted);
see also generally Robert W. Gordon, Portraitof a Profession in Paralysis, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 1427 (2002) (reviewing DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:
REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000)) (proposing the lifting of restrictions on
these activities).
26 ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Discussion Draft, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter
Ethics Comm'n Discussion Draft for Cmt. of Dec. 2011], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20
111202-ethics2020-discussiondraft-alps.authcheckdam.pdf.
27 ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Working Group on Alt. Bus. Structures
Request for Cmt.: Issues Paper Concerning Alternative Business Structures, at 5
(2011) [hereinafter Ethics Comm'n Request for Cmt. of Apr. 2011], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics-2020/ab
s_issues.paper.authcheckdam.pdf.
28 Id. at 6.
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that such changes will further the public interest without
sacrificing or compromising lawyer independence and the legal
profession's tradition of loyalty to clients." 29
The MDP Commission continued to study and accept
comments on these issues, and in July 2000 it issued a new report
to the House of Delegates again recommending changes to the
Model Rules, but with "more restrictions on proposed
multidisciplinary practices" than before.30 The key change in the
new report was that "only lawyer-controlled MDPs would be
permitted under the new recommendation." 31 The House again
rejected the MDP Commission's recommendation stating that
"[t]he sharing of legal fees with nonlawyers and the ownership
and control of the practice of law by nonlawyers are inconsistent
with the core values of the legal profession" and the rule
prohibiting such sharing of fees "should not be revised." 32
Recently, legal reforms abroad allowing multidisciplinary
practices and alternative business structures have prompted
reconsideration of these issues by the Ethics Commission. 33 The
principles guiding the Commission's deliberations are "protection
of the public; preservation of core professional values; and
maintenance of a strong, independent and self-regulated
profession."3 4 At its February 2011 meeting in Atlanta, the
Commission decided that, "two options for alternative business
structures -passive equity investment in law firms and the public
trading of law firm interests" would not be recommended.3 5 When
the Commission released its April 5, 2011 Issues Paper, it requested
comments on just three of the five alternative business models it
limited lawyer/nonlawyer partnerships
originally considered:
with a cap on nonlawyer ownership; lawyer/nonlawyer
partnerships without such a cap; and firms with lawyers and
nonlawyers that offer both legal and non-legal services. 36
29

30

Id. (quoting Report to ABA House of Delegates 10B (as revised) (1999)).
Id. (discussing Report to ABA House of Delegates 117 (2000)).

31 Id.
32 Id.

Id. at 7.
34 Id. at 1.
35 Id. at 2.
36 Id. at 17-19.
The second option is currently allowed in the District of
Columbia. Id. at 17.
33
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However, in June 2011, the Commission "eliminated further
consideration of the third approach set out in the Issues Paper" multidisciplinary practices "in which lawyers offer legal services
and nonlawyers offer other professional services to clients who
may or may not also be using the firm's legal services." 37 This
decision was in line with the ABA's consideration and strong
rejection of the proposal to permit multidisciplinary practices back
in 1999 and 2000.
As a result of the February and June 2011 narrowing of possible
options for consideration, the Commission "narrowed further
consideration of [alternative law practice structures]" to just the
"first two options identified in the [April 2011] Issues Paper." 38
The two options left were:
(1) Option B: The approach taken by the District of
Columbia, which permits lawyers to share legal fees
with nonlawyers where the lawyers practice law in a
partnership or other form of organization in which a
financial interest is held or managerial authority is
exercised by one or more nonlawyers who provide
services that assist the firm in providing legal services
to clients, under certain conditions, but without a cap
on nonlawyer ownership; and
(2) Option A: A narrower version of the District of
Columbia approach, which would permit lawyers to
become partners with (and share fees with)
defined
narrowly
nonlawyers ...under
circumstances. 39
This rather narrow inquiry did not result in sufficient support
for revising the ABA rules, so the Ethics Commission "decided not
to develop a proposal on whether nonlawyers should be allowed
to have some form of limited ownership interest in U.S. law
firms."4 0
Indeed, most comments to the Ethics Commission were
Nine General Counsel for large multinational
negative.

37

Ethics Comm'n Discussion Draft for Cmt. of Dec. 2011, supra note 26, at 5.

38 Id.
39 Id.
40

Podgers, supra note 3.

2013]1

WILL LAW FIRMS GO PUBLIC?

495

corporations vigorously opposed changes to Rule 5.4 on several
grounds. 41 First, there was no demonstrated need for change.42
Second, any nonlawyer ownership of law firms would undermine
the attorney-client relationship, especially the duty of
confidentiality.43 Third, the General Counsel were "deeply
troubled by a proposed change that would only further undermine
the tradition that law is a profession rather than a business."44
Finally, the General Counsel expressed the view that nonlawyer
ownership of law firms could undermine the judicial and selfregulatory oversight of the legal profession and lead to
government regulation. 45
Professor Thomas Morgan submitted a contrary comment,
based on the reality that law is no longer practiced primarily by
individuals-but rather by institutions

-and

therefore, the ethics

rules of the profession are out of date. 46 Therefore, the distinction
that it is "lawful for lawyers to employ nonlawyers but not to
become their partner if any of the services would traditionally be
viewed as practicing law .. . is surely a distinction without a
difference."4 7 Additionally, there are three reasons why law firms
might legitimately sell equity. First, they have traditionally paid

41 See generally ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Comments of Nine General
Counsel on the ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20 Discussion Paper on Alternative
Law Practice Structures (2012), [hereinafter Comments of Nine General Counsel],
available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
ethics 2020/ethics 20_20 comments/ninegeneralcounselcomments-alpschoiceofl
awinitialdraftproposal.authcheckdam.pdf.
42 Id. at 2-3.
43 Id. at 3-4. On the issue of how confidentiality might be undermined by
outside capital, see generally ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Draft White Paper on
Alternative Litigation Finance, at 32-38 (2011), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/ dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111019_draft
altfwhite-paper posting.authcheckdam.pdf.
44 Comments of Nine General Counsel, supra note 41, at 4-5. Considering the
source, this comment is a bit rich. General Counsel of large companies enjoy stock
options, which has made them not too different from other corporate executives,
and their work can sometimes become a profit center.
45 Id. at 5-6.
46 See generally, ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Comments of Professor
Thomas D. Morgan on the Discussion Paper on the Alternative Law Practice
Structures (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/ethics 2020/ethics 20_20_comments/morgan-alpsdiscussiondraf
t.authcheckdam.pdf.
47

Id. at 4.
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out profits instead of retaining earnings. Second, selling equity
could create a liquid market in firm shares for the benefit of
departing partners. Third, a more lasting institutional character for
a modem firm could be created for "brand identity and its
reputation for ethics and quality." 48
Despite the decision of the Ethics Committee not to go forward
with changes to Rule 5.4, a resolution was presented to the ABA
House of Delegates in the summer of 2012, asking for reaffirmance
of its stand against nonlawyer ownership of law firms. 49 This issue
came up in the context of fee-sharing arrangements between
lawyers and nonlawyers in jurisdictions that allow nonlawyer
investment in law firms -especially England, Australia, and
Canada. The Ethics Commission has requested comment on how
to resolve conflicts of law between ethics rules in different
recognition of nonlawyer
jurisdictions.5 0 This could lead to 51
ownership of firms where it is allowed. The resolution regarding
reaffirmance of nonlawyer ownership of firms was so controversial
that ninety-two people asked to speak for or against it, but only
four people spoke before the House voted to postpone the
resolution indefinitely. 52 Nevertheless, this issue will not go away,
in part because it is tied to the conflict of law issue at firms where
there are partners from England and partners from a U.S.
jurisdiction.53
In August 2013, the Ethics Commission issued a formal opinion
stating that lawyers in jurisdictions that follow Rule 5.4 "may work
with other lawyers or law firms practicing in jurisdictions with
rules that permit sharing legal fees with nonlawyers." 54 The
opinion relied upon Model Rule 1.5(e), which permits lawyers
Id. at 5-6.
Debra Cassens Weiss, ABA House Postpones Resolution Reaffirming
Opposition to Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 6, 2012, 11:26
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/resolutionconfirms aba
AM),
stance against-nonlawyer ownership-oflaw-firms/.
50 See Joan C. Rogers, Ethics 20/20 Floats Revised Proposal on Agreements for
Choice of Conflicts Rules, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jul. 18, 2012), http://www.
bna.com/ethics-2020-floats-nl2884910736.
51 Weiss, supra note 49 (reporting a statement made by Lawrence Fox, a
member of the House of Delegates from Philadelphia).
48

49

52 Id.
53
54

See id.
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 464, at 1 (2013).
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working at different firms to divide legal fees in certain
situations.55 Additionally, the August 2013 opinion cited ABA
Formal Opinion 91-360 for the proposition that lawyers should not
be restricted by rules in jurisdictions where they do not practice. 56
Thus, the Ethics Commission found that the Model Rules support
fee-sharing between lawyers, where one lawyer may legally
engage in sharing fees with nonlawyers so long as "there is no
interference with the lawyer's independent professional
judgment."5 7
It would appear that the opposition by the ABA to nonlawyer
participation in law firms, either in the form of multidisciplinary
practices or equity investment may be driven at least as much by
economic protectionism as a need to protect the core values of the
profession.58 In addition, the ABA and many members of the legal
Although
profession are wary of threats to self-regulation.
nonlawyer participation in law firm governance could undermine
professional judgment, is the threat of control by equity investors
necessarily more pernicious than the threat of control by bank
lenders?59 In-house counsels who work for corporations may claim
that the corporation is their client, but they are nevertheless subject
to control by their corporate employers. 60
The threat to
maintaining client confidentiality is a legitimate concern, but this
threat is already present when lawyers work with nonlawyers in
connection with the representation of clients.61 What the bar and
other policy makers should consider is whether some of the
benefits of nonlawyer involvement in law firms might outweigh
the danger that the core values of the profession could be
undermined, and what mechanisms could be devised to protect
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2-3.
57 Id. at 1.
5 See Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One
Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 616-17 (1989)
(noting the fear that ruinous competition may develop if for-profit law offices are
allowed).
59 Id. at 608-09.
60 Id. It is somewhat ironic that one of the strongest comments against
changes in the ethics rules came from general counsel from some of the largest
corporations in the United States. Comments of Nine General Counsel, supra note
41, at 6-7.
61 Andrews, supra note 58, at 615-16.
55
56
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those core values in the face of changes to the organization of law
firms.
1.2. New York Rules
In the late 1990s, the New York State Bar Association, along
with the ABA and other bar organizations, was considering
whether demand for multidisciplinary practice firms should lead
to changes in ethics rules. As a result, the New York ethics rules
were revised in recognition of the need for law firms sometimes to
provide clients with non-legal services and the difficulty of
distinguishing between legal and non-legal services in certain
situations.
The revised Rule 5.7 of the New York Rules of Professional
Conduct 62 envisions a firm controlled by lawyers, but requires that
if non-legal services are provided to a client; the recipient must be
made aware of any services not subject to the attorney-client
relationship; the relationship shall be subject to lawyer professional
ethics rules when the client cannot distinguish between legal and
non-legal services; and, any nonlawyers in the firm may not affect
a lawyer's professional judgment or compromise a lawyer's
professional responsibilities. 63 Another change in the rule allows a
lawyer or law firm to enter into a contractual relationship with a
nonlawyer professional or firm.6 4 This rule is stricter than the rule
allowing nonlawyers to join a law firm and provide non-legal
services because, among other things, it is limited to contracts with
only five professionals: architects, certified public accountants,
professional engineers, surveyors, and certified social workers. 65
Neither of these rules would permit nonlawyer ownership or
investments in a law firm.
As will be explained below, it is now legal in
England and some other jurisdictions for nonlawyer supervisors
and owners to be included as principals of a law firm. When a law
firm asked for guidance from the New York State Bar Association
as to whether a New York law firm could become an employee of a

62 N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note 16, at R. 5.7 (2009), available at
http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=26646.
63 Cone, supra note 23, at 418.
64 N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr, supra note 16, at R. 5.8.
65 Cone, supra note 23, at 418.
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U.K. entity which included nonlawyers, the Committee on
Professional Ethics responded in the negative: "The inquiry is
governed by Rule 5.4(a), which forbids a lawyer from sharing fees
with a nonlawyer, and Rule 5.4(d), which forbids a lawyer from
practicing law for profit with an entity that includes a nonlawyer
owner or member. These provisions would clearly be violated by
the proposed arrangement." 66
The Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance
Committee reached a contrary conclusion, deciding that if lawyers
in jurisdictions outside Pennsylvania permit fee sharing with
nonlawyers in accordance with their own bar rules, it is
permissible for Pennsylvania lawyers to share fees with them, even
though they cannot share fees with nonlawyers in the state. 67 It is
this conflict in the views of two important jurisdictions that led the
ABA Ethics Committee to consider how conflict of laws should
apply to firms which have partners from jurisdictions with
different ethical rules. 68
1.3. Districtof Columbia Bar Rules
1.3.1. History of District of Columbia Professional Conduct Rule 5.4
In the years that followed the ABA's 1983 adoption of the
Model Rules, many states adopted professional rules for their own
jurisdictions that were similar or identical to the ABA's Rules.
Many states adopted the ABA's Model Rules verbatim. The
District of Columbia, however, departed drastically from the trend
of most other states 69 when it considered adopting the proposed
Rule 5.4 that had been rejected by the ABA.

66 N.Y. State Bar Assoc. Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Op. 911 (2012), available at
http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=4182.
67 Phila. Bar Ass'n Prof'1 Guidance Comm., Op. 2010-7, at 3 (2010), availableat
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/W
ebServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion_2010-7Final.pdf.
68 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
69 North Dakota was the only other jurisdiction to consider adopting the
version of Rule 5.4 rejected by the ABA. See Bradley G. Johnson, Ready or Not,
Here They Come: Why the ABA Should Amend the Model Rules to Accommodate
Multidisciplinary Practices, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 951, 963-64 (2000) (describing
North Dakota's consideration and ultimate rejection of a proposal closely
resembling Model Rule 5.4).
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The D.C. Bar had come to recognize "an increasing demand for
a broad range of professional services from a single provider." 70
As Mark Lynch, member of the D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee
("Ethics Committee") and author of the D.C. Bar Rule 5.4 later
explained, "the committee perceived a market demand for onestop shopping-for collaborative services of lawyers with such
other professionals as accountants, lobbyists, social workers and
economists."7 1 Dissatisfaction with Rule 3-103, which limited
partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers to providing nonlegal services, led Mark Lynch to advocate for a proposed change
in the rule. 7 2 In 1986, Chairman Robert Jordan of the Ethics
Committee ultimately presented a proposed Rule 5.4 to the D.C.
Board of Governors that was identical to the version rejected by the
ABA. 73
When the proposal came before the D.C. Board of Governors in
February of that year, several Board members expressed
reservations about the proposed Rule, which did not originally
include a provision that partnership be limited to the practice of
law. 74 Board member Jamie Gorelick 75 was concerned with
70 Id. at 962. Moreover, Washington D.C. was already "the undisputed center
of ancillary business activity, so official acceptance of the practice there [was]
hardly surprising." Marjorie Meeks, Alterfing] People's Perceptions: The Challenge
Facing Advocates of Ancillary Business Practices, 66 IND. L.J. 1031, 1053 (1991).
71 Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: Moderate Proposals
Deserve a Chance, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 383, 393 (1988) (citing interview with
Mark Lynch). The idea of "one-stop shopping," at least with regard to lawyers
employing nonlawyer professionals to provide nonlawyer services to clients, was
not an unfamiliar concept to the D.C. Bar. In 1980, the D.C. Ethics Committee
issued an opinion stating that "[i]t is ethically proper for a lawyer, law firm or
professional corporation, while engaging in the practice of law, also to offer and
furnish services of other professionals, such as (in this case) psychologists, social
workers and family counselors." Id. (citing D.C. Bar Code of Prof'1 Responsibility
& Opinions of the D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 93 (1980) [hereinafter D.C.
Bar Code and Opinions]). Despite this opinion, D.C. Disciplinary Rule 3-103
continued to prohibit a lawyer from having "a nonlawyer as a partner in an
enterprise which involves the practice of law (even though it may involve other
activities as well)." Id. at 394.
72 Id. at 393 n.43. Further fueling Lynch's suggestion was the fact that, over
the years, the Ethics Committee "had received numerous inquiries from people
who wanted collaborative services between lawyers and other professionals." Id.
(citing Minutes of the D.C. Bar Board of Governors).
73 Id. at 394.
7 Proposed Rule 5.4 originally allowed lawyer/nonlawyer partnerships only
if (1) there was no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; (2) the confidences and secrets of
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whether nonlawyer partners would "recognize potential conflicts
between clients," 76 and whether they would "give conflicts the
same sensitive treatment that a lawyer is required to give."77
Gorelick also worried that if a lawyer "did not control the flow of
information" in such an enterprise, a court might refuse to
recognize the well-established attorney-client privilege or workproduct protection. 78 In addition, Board members questioned
whether the proposed Rule 5.4 could "adequately protect against
acts by the nonlawyer partner which, if they were done by a
lawyer, would violate the rules of professional conduct." 79 Board
members noted that such protection was already in place in the
traditional lawyer/nonlawyer employer-employee relationship.
Ultimately, these concerns, coupled with an all-around fear that
adoption of the Rule would "pave[] the way for conglomerates of
lawyers and nonlawyers," led the Jordan Committee to modify the
Rule to limit "the activities of the partnership to the practice of
law."80
Another bout of skepticism-this time through the media
outlets -occurred after the D.C. Board of Governors submitted its
proposed Rules of Professional Conduct to the D.C. Court of
the lawyer's clients were protected as required by D.C. Bar Rule 1.6; (3) the
arrangement did not involve advertising or personal contact with prospective
clients by the nonlawyer, as prohibited by D.C. Bar Rule 7.1; (4) the arrangement
did not result in charging a fee that violated D.C. Bar Rule 1.5; and (5) the
foregoing conditions were set forth in writing. Id.
75 Gorelick was President of the D.C. Bar from 1992-93 and is currently on
the Ethics Commission of the ABA. People: Jamie Gorelick, WILMERHALE, http://
www.wilmerhale.com/jamie-gorelick/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
76 Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 71, at 394.
7
Id. at 395.
78 Id.
79 Id.
8o Id.
According to an interview with Chairman Jordan after the Rule's
adoption, the idea was "let's try this for a while. Let's not fundamentally change
the nature of the institutions providing legal services." Id. at 396 (quoting
Interview by Larry Lempert with Robert Jordan, Chairman, Jordan Comm'n for
the D.C. Bar (Dec. 1, 1987)). President-elect of the D.C. Bar at the time, Paul
Friedman, expressed reservations similar to those of Chairman Jordan and other
Board members. During a later interview with Friedman, he said "[ylou don't
want a law firm with twenty partners, eleven of them economists. Then it's no
longer a law firm[.]" Id. (quoting Interview by Larry Lempert with Paul
Friedman, President-elect of the D.C. Bar (Feb. 12, 1988)). According to Friedman,
law firms should not be managed by "people without knowledge of and
commitment to the ethics rules [binding on lawyers]." Id.
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Appeals in November 1986. The National Law Journal and Business
Week both released articles in January of 1987 discussing the socalled "Fear of Sears." This was part of the same sentiment that
had doomed the proposed Rule 5.4 in the ABA House of Delegates,
which involved an overwhelming fear that the Bar Association
rules could allow firms eventually to go public "pav[ing] the way
for such retailers as Sears, Roebuck & Co. to add legal counseling
to their array of services."8 1
In the end, the D.C. Court of Appeals approved the D.C. Rule
with the added clarification that "[a] lawyer may practice law in a
partnership ... in which a financial interest or managerial
authority is exercised by an individual nonlawyer who performs
professional services which assist the organization in providing legal
services to clients." 82 In addition, the Court of Appeals added
several comments to the Rule describing the types of
lawyer/nonlawyer partnerships the D.C. Bar had in mind. These
partnerships included those between economists and antitrust
lawyers, CPAs and tax attorneys, and psychologists and family law
practitioners. The additional comments "banish[ed] the Sears,
Roebuck specter" once and for all, and final adoption of the rule
occurred on March 1, 1990.83

81 Id. at 398. See Paula Dwyer, Soon Anybody May Be Able to Own a Law Firm,
Bus. WK., Jan. 26, 1987, at 42 (explaining how such rules would allow nonlawyers
to own law firms); David A. Kaplan, Ethics Change in Works: Want to Invest in a Law
Firm?, NATL L.J., Jan. 19, 1987, at 1 (documenting proposed rules in Washington,
D.C. and North Dakota that would allow substantial layperson involvement in
law firms). This outcry from the media caused the Jordan Committee to submit a
supplementary petition to the D.C. Court of Appeals, the highest court in the
District of Columbia, clarifying the proposed Rule 5.4. Adams & Matheson, supra
note 25, at 12. The petition stated that "[t]here was no thought that proposed Rule
5.4 should permit any organization or entity to effectively acquire and control a
law firm." Id. (quoting Supplementary Petition of the Bd. of Governors of the
D.C. Bar Regarding the Adoption of Rules of Prof'l Conduct and Related
Comments, at 4-5 (Sept. 11, 1987)). According to Chairman Jordan, the purpose
"was to permit nonlawyer professionals to practice their professional skills in
cooperation with lawyers in a firm limited to delivering legal services." Gilbert &
Lempert, supra note 71, at 399 (quoting Memorandum of Robert Jordan,
Chairman, Jordan Comm'n for the D.C. Bar, to the D.C. Court of Appeals 63 (Mar.
4, 1987)).
82 Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 71, at 399 (emphasis in original).
83 Id. at 399-400.
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1.3.2. Effects of ProfessionalConduct D.C. Bar Rule 5.4 Since Its
Adoption in 1991
In a "Report and Recommendation" issued in the late 1990s,
the District of Columbia Bar Special Committee
on
Multidisciplinary Practice reviewed the effects of Rule 5.4 since the
rule's adoption:
Nearly a decade of experience under the 1991 version of
Rule 5.4 has produced no evidence in the District of
Columbia that lawyers are unable to honor their
professional obligations when they offer legal services
within the framework of organizations in which
nonlawyers hold an ownership interest or exercise
managerial authority.84
In addition, no disciplinary action under D.C. Rule 5.4(b) has
been taken against any lawyer of the D.C. Bar since it became
effective in 1991.85
Despite the seeming freedom granted to lawyers in D.C. who
wish to form partnerships with nonlawyers, many law firms in
D.C. have never taken advantage of Rule 5.4. The rule's limiting
condition requiring such partnerships to provide legal services as
their sole purpose has proven to be a "major stumbling block." 86
The scope of the rule was even further limited when the D.C. Bar
adopted ABA Ethics Committee Formal Opinion 91-360, issued in
July 1991, which prohibits multi-jurisdictional law firms from
having nonlawyer partners in their D.C. office.87

84 D.C. Bar Special Comm. on Multidisciplinary Prac., Proposed Rule 5.4:
Professional Independence of a Lawyer: Note on History of the Rule (1999).
85 Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPS: Should the "No" Rule Become a New
Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 869, 875 (1999) (citing Testimony of D.C. Ethics Counsel
Susan Gilbert (Nov. 12, 1998)).
86 Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of
Purchasing Legal Services From Lawyers in a MultidisciplinaryPartnership, 13 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHIcs 217, 244 (2000).
87 Terry, supra note 85, at 875. As such, even multi-state law firms that wish
to take advantage of Rule 5.4 are inevitably prevented from doing so and the
availability of the rule is left to "D.C.-based boutique law firms that identify a
specific need (i.e., the need for an accountant to do tax work or the need for an
office manager)." Id.
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1.3.3. Consulting Subsidiariesof Arnold & PorterLLP
Some of the impetus for the change in the rules of the D.C. Bar
came from Arnold & Porter LLP, which experimented with mixing
the practice of law with other professional services through
ownership of three consulting firm subsidiaries. None of these
ventures proved permanent, however. The first, APCO Associates
Inc., was created in 1984 as a wholly owned subsidiary of Arnold &
Porter LLP. APCO began as a multidisciplinary practice that dealt
with public affairs, government relations, and strategic
communications.88 APCO was eventually sold in 1991 to Grey
Advertising. On September 24, 2004, APCO announced that its
management concluded a buyout from Grey Global, making it
"one of the largest privately owned consulting firms in the public
affairs and strategic communications industry." 89
Around the same time Arnold & Porter opened APCO, it
formed another subsidiary called MPC & Associates. MPC was a
real estate development consulting firm "that worked primarily
with colleges, universities, and other large nonprofit institutions on
major real estate projects." 90 MPC evolved because of the
"extensive work" Arnold & Porter had already been doing in its
representation of non-profit institutional clients for which the firm
was "retained to deal with exceedingly complex, sprawling real

88 James W. Jones, Vice Chairman and General Counsel, APCO Assocs.,
Statement to the Center for Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Assoc.
(Feb. 6, 1999), availableat http://www.americanbar.org/ groups/professional
[hereinafter
responsibility/commission multidisciplinary-practice/jonesl.html
Jones Statement]. According to Jones, who served as Vice-Chairman and General
Counsel of APCO,

APCO was conceived as a vehicle for broadening the scope of services
offered by Arnold & Porter to its clients and as a means for offering
services in a more efficient and cost-effective manner. It grew out of the
conviction that-at least for certain
types of matters - an
interdisciplinary approach combining the skills of lawyers and
nonlawyer professionals could lead to better and more creative solutions
for client problems.
Id.
89 Press Release, APCO Worldwide and Grey Global Grp., Inc., APCO
Completes Transaction for Management Buyout (Sept. 28, 2004) (on file with
author).
90 Jones Statement, supra note 88.
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estate projects." 91 MPC was eventually sold to Sallie Mae, but
scant information about the sale is publicly available.
Arnold & Porter also opened a financial industry consulting
firm called The Secura Group in 1987. The Group served
commercial banks and thrift institutions, as well as investors of
those entities. The Secura Group was created to complement
Arnold & Porter's large bank regulatory practice, and in 1989,
James F. Fitzpatrick of Arnold & Porter said in an address: "[t]here
is great synergism between our bank regulatory practice and
Secura. There is a significant overlap in client base, and one group
helps spin off business for the other." 92 Fitzpatrick noted at the
time, however, that "particular attention must be paid to the
ethical requirements that clients requesting non-legal services have
full opportunity to go wherever they want for the legal component
of those services." 93 The Secura Group eventually purchased
Arnold & Porter's interest in the Group in 1993, and it is no longer
a subsidiary of Arnold & Porter. 94
When Vice Chairman and General Counsel of APCO James
Jones made his statement to the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice on February 6, 1999, he said that when
Arnold & Porter created their subsidiaries, the "impact of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct on their structure and operations
was far from clear." 95 Thus, in order to ensure that the subsidiaries
did not run afoul of the ABA professional ethics rules, Arnold &
Porter put several elements into place. For example, Arnold &
Porter required that all promotional literature and retainer
agreements disclose the fact that the consulting firms were
subsidiaries of Arnold & Porter, and that the consulting clients
were under no obligation to use Arnold & Porter's legal services.
The promotional materials also had to be pre-approved by Arnold
& Porter's ethics committee "using principles consistent with those
applicable in the legal profession." 96 Arnold & Porter also held
91 James F. Fitzpatrick, Legal Future Shock: The Role of Large Law Firms by the
End of the Century, 64 IND. L.J. 461, 470 (1989).
92 Id. at 468.
93 Id.
94 Jim McTague, Secura Forms Alliance with Andersen, AM. BANKER, Jan. 18,
1994, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-14919203.html.
95 Jones Statement, supra note 88, at 2.
96 Id.
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each subsidiary to "the same ethical requirements-in terms of
conflicts of interest, protection of client confidences, advertising of
services, etc. -that applied to the law firm itself." 97 In addition,
any questions concerning these issues were "required to be
resolved by the firm's ethics committee and not by the subsidiary
company." 98
1.4. Threats to the Rules
Even if bar associations do not alter traditional ethics rules
prohibiting multidisciplinary firms or ownership of interests in law
firms by nonlawyers, the financing of law firms is likely to change
either due to international competition (which will be discussed
below), changing business practices on the ground, or as a result of
lawsuits challenging the ethics rules. Competition from other
professionals is also a factor in the changing complexion of the
legal services industry. Although accounting and consulting firms
eschew the idea that they are providing legal advice, the line
between such services is often a line in the sand. This is
particularly true because of the emphasis on compliance, corporate
governance, and risk management systems in financial and other
businesses. Further, it has long been true with regard to tax law
practice. 99
Prior to 2002, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) did not stop accounting firms from providing consulting
services to their audit clients, although arguably it could have done
so. Although the SEC was empowered to define "independence"
in terms of the filing and certification of financial statements by
independent auditors, Congress had not given the SEC the specific
authority to regulate auditing standards.10 0 Early attempts by the
SEC to place limits on accounting firms' ability to provide
consulting services to audit clients were unsuccessful because of
"contentious arguments between [the then-]Big Five accounting
firms and the SEC."lI

97

Id.

98 Id.

99 Andrews, supra note 58, at 632-36.
100 Robert J. Anello, Sarbanes-Oxley's Wake Up Call to Attorneys, 22 PENN ST.
INT'L L. REv. 545, 552 (2003-04).
101 Id.
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After the fall of Enron and a number of other corporate and
accounting scandals in 2001, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley),102 which created new and enhanced
standards for the accounting profession. In addition to creating the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and
granting it the power to establish rules and regulations governing
the accounting profession, Sarbanes-Oxley granted the SEC the
authority to adopt its own rules to "expand the requirements of
auditor independence." 0 3 Section 201(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley04
effectively put an end to the multidisciplinary practices "that had
been cultivated by the Big Five accounting firms" prior to 2002.105
This provision makes it unlawful for a registered public accounting
firm that is performing an audit for an issuer to
contemporaneously provide certain non-audit services, including
legal services.1 06 Although the list of non-audit services is
extensive, it does not prohibit the contemporaneous performance
of tax consulting services so long as pre-approval is received from
the issuer's accounting board. In addition, the PCAOB may add to
the list of prohibited services "any other service that the Board
determines, by regulation, is impermissible."1 07
Though accounting firms are limited in their ability to provide
consulting services to audit clients, they can provide these services
to other clients; thus, big accounting firms have developed
sophisticated consulting practices. Independent consulting
organizations have done so as well. For example, Deloitte, one of
the Big Four accounting firms, has an affiliated subsidiary called
Deloitte Financial Advisory Services LLP that advises clients on a
variety of matters that overlap with the advice given by business
102 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 11, 15,
18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
103 Anello, supranote 100, at 555.
78
104 15 U.S.C. §
j-1(g) (2012).
105 Anello, supranote 100, at 561.
106 Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits auditors from performing non-audit services for
their clients, including (1) bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting
records or financial statements of the audit client; (2) financial information
systems design and implementation; (3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness
opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit
outsourcing services; (6) management functions or human resources; (7) broker or
dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services; and (8) legal services
and expert services unrelated to the audit. 15 U.S.C. § 78 j-1(g) (2012).
107

Id.
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lawyers. To that end, its services include managing business
controversies and disputes, executing deals, and maintaining
regulatory compliance.1 08 In addition, Deloitte advertises to hire
legal services employees in corporate law, corporate governance,
corporate reorganizations, private equity, venture capital, and
other categories that overlap with services provided to clients by
law firms. 109 Likewise, Accenture, a publicly traded consulting
firm that spun off from Arthur Anderson, another large accounting
firm, advertises for its Legal Services Group.1 10
These activities do not mean that Deloitte or Accenture are
engaging in the illegal practice of law, but rather that legal services
are not confined to the courtroom, and the giving of legal advice in
connection with business transactions and compliance matters is
difficult to distinguish from management consulting. Even in
litigation, consulting organizations provide legal as well as other
These services overlap with the services
professional experts."
provided by business lawyers, and law firms experiencing
economic stress may decide they should be competing with
accountants and consultants in advising corporations and other
businesses. This was the pressure that led to changes in the ethics
rules of the D.C. bar a number of years ago.
Outsourcing of legal work to lawyers and nonlawyers and the
utilization of nonlawyers with regard to the work of large law
firms have raised some questions about nonlawyer participation in
the provision of legal services and its impact on ethical rules.
These issues were addressed by the Ethics Commission and
resulted in some minor modifications to Rules 1.1 Competence, 5.3
Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistance, and 5.5
Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law.

Services,
DELOlTTE,
Advisory
Financial
More:
108 Learn
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en US/ us/Services/Financial-AdvisoryServices/a27e4bdacd0fbllOVgnVCM100000ba42fO0aRCRD.htm (last visited July
22, 2013).
109 Legal Services, DELOITIE, http://www.deloitte.com/view/enGX/global/
services/deloitte-legal/index.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
110 Legal & Commercial Services, Talent Segments, ACCENTURE, http://
(last
careers.accenture.com/us-en/your-future/career-paths/Pages/index.aspx
visited Sept. 9, 2012).
111 See, e.g., ROUND TABLE GROUP, http://www.roundtablegroup.com

(last

visited Nov. 13, 2013) (providing an example of a consulting firm that provides
legal and other professional services).
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The Ethics Committee suggested only minor changes in the rules,
but it submitted an interesting report on outsourcing.11 2 The report
emphasized appropriate supervision and the ban on assisting in
the unauthorized practice of law.
The widespread use of temporary lawyers from agencies and
the outsourcing of legal work can be justified under ethics rules
because law firm partners supervise these independent contractors.
But what is the justification when the independent contractors
combine to provide legal services directly to clients? A very
interesting example of such a firm is Axiom Global, Inc. (Axiom), a
long-term legal placement agency with 450 temporary attorneys.
Although it began by supplying lawyers to the financial services
industry, it changed its business model after 2008 and now does
outsourcing work for large corporations such as Hewlett-Packard
Co., Kraft Foods, and Vodaphone. Some of the legal work for these
businesses was formerly done in house. "Since its inception,
Axiom has been the beneficiary of more than $30 million in venture
capital."113 Because it is a corporation with nonlawyer investors, it
is limited by the rules of ethics so that it is unable to render legal
opinions, represent a client in court, take a company public, or lead
a major corporate transaction. 114
Nevertheless, Axiom is
competing directly with business lawyers and is being financed by
nonlawyers. Axiom's business model could possibly be defended
pursuant to cases upholding pre-paid group legal services or the
right of non-profit groups to provide services to their members. 115
Another development that is undermining current ethics rules
is the financing of claims and contingency fees in plaintiff side
112 ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, House of Delegate Resolution 105C
Adopted -Amends the Comments to Model Rules 1.1, 5.3, and 5.5 (2012) (on file
with author.)
113 Drew Combs, DisruptiveInnovation, AM. LAW., July/Aug. 2012, at 1,
availableat http://www.axiomlaw.com/Images/ Attorneys/OOl8ll2OlAxim.pdf.
See also LEGALZOOM.COM (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) (advertising the provision of
some legal services, such as wills, over the Internet).
114 Id. See also Daniel Fisher, New Precedent for Law Firms, FORBES (June 8,
2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/0627/entrepreneurs-markharris-axiom-law-moving-target.html (describing Axiom's business model of
providing temporary attorney placement).
115 See Andrews, supra note 58, at 636-40 (describing extensive nonlawyer
involvement in prepaid group legal services, supported by U.S. Supreme Court
decisions upholding the rights of nonprofit groups to provide legal services. Note
that Axiom is an openly for-profit corporation).
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Banks, hedge funds, and private investors are
lawsuits.
bankrolling lawsuits with loans that have high interest rates. If the
case is successful, the loans are repaid out of the proceeds of the
recovery.11 6 Although these investments are loans rather than
equity, so they do not directly contravene ethical prohibitions
against nonlawyer investments in law firms, questions have been
raised about investor control of the lawsuits and whether the duty
of confidentiality has been breached. 1 7
Litigation attacking current ethics rules is underway and under
contemplation. This litigation will be discussed below. Although
this litigation has been premised on constitutional grounds, it is
unclear what constitutional rights are impinged upon by the rules
preventing nonlawyer investment in law firms or multidisciplinary
practices.118 Yet, a very interesting article has argued that
preventing corporations from owning law firms violates the First
Amendment.119 Another possible attack on the prohibitions of
equity investment in law firms by nonlawyers is under the
antitrust laws.
In view of the deregulation of other industries, specifically
investment banking and stock exchanges, which will be discussed
below, and the rationale for reforms in the England, Australia, and
Canada, challenges under the antitrust laws may also be made, but
such challenges face substantial problems because of the
involvement of the courts in lawyer regulation.

116 Binyamin Appelbaum, Investors Put Money on Lawsuits to Get Payouts, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/business/
15lawsuit.html?pagewanted=all; Lisa Rickard, Thy are Hedge Funds Allowed to
Invest in Litigation?, THE ATLANTIC (July 3, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://www.
theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/07/why-are-hedge-funds-allowed-toinvest-in-litigation/259345/.
u1 Id.
118 See Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. The Presiding Justices of the Appellate Div.,
847 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (ruling that Jacoby & Meyers, LLP and an
affiliate lacked standing to seek a declaration that N.Y. R. Prof. Conduct 5.4 (22
NYCRR 1200.0), which prohibited nonlawyer equity investment in law practices,
was unconstitutional).

119 Knake, supra note 19.
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REGULATION OF LAWYERS ABROAD

2.1. In England and Wales
The Legal Services Act of 2007 (LS Act) 120 reformed the
regulation of lawyers in the England and Wales to encourage
competition and deal with consumer complaints. The LS Act
provides for the creation of alternative business structures (ABS)
for law firms permitting lawyers and nonlawyers to work together,
and allowing for external investment in firms. The predicate for
this reform was a December 2004 Report by Sir David Clementi
(Clementi Report) 121 commissioned " [tio consider what regulatory
framework would best promote competition, innovation and the
public and consumer interest in an efficient, effective and
independent legal sector." 122 Sir Clementi was also instructed to
recommend a new framework for the regulation of the legal
profession pursuant to a reformed structure. This commission
resulted from a report by the Department for Constitutional Affairs
that had reached the conclusion that the English regulatory
framework for lawyers was "outdated, inflexible, over-complex
and insufficiently accountable or transparent."123
There are two premises that underlay the Clementi Report and
the LS Act that stand in the way of similar reform by the ABA. The
first premise is a rejection of the idea that the roles of lawyers as
professionals and as business people conflict. According to Sir
Clementi, "[a]ccess to justice requires not only that the legal advice
given is sound, but also the presence of business skills necessary to
provide a cost-effective service in a consumer-friendly way."1 24
The second premise is a rejection of self-regulation that lacks
significant government oversight and has no nonlawyer
involvement.

120 Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29 (U.K.) [hereinafter Legal Services Act],
available
at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/29/pdfs/ukpga 20070029en.pdf.

121 SIR DAVID CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL
SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES: FINAL REPORT (2004) [hereinafter CLEMENTI
REPORT].
122 Id. at 1.
123 Id. (internal citations omitted).
124 Id. at 5.
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The Clementi Report comes to a number of important
conclusions regarding multi-disciplinary practices and outside
ownership of such firms. It concludes that outside ownership of
law firms should be permitted. Sir Clementi expressed the view
that "[sluch ownership should be subject to a 'fit to own' test; but
the main focus of the regulatory authorities should be upon the
identity of the management team."125 This type of ownership was
already permitted with regard to conveyancing services, and the
Report proposed that "subject to proper safeguards ... it should

now be permitted in other areas of the legal services market."126
The Report was more equivocal on the subject of multidisciplinary practices "which bring together lawyers and other
professionals to provide legal and other services to third
parties." 127 It recognized that there were many issues to be
resolved before such practices could be permitted and regulated,
but it suggested that a new regulatory system would be a step on
the way to allowing multi-disciplinary practices.
The LS Act implemented the Clementi Report by establishing
the Legal Services Board (LSB) and Office for Legal Complaints
(OLC) for the regulation of lawyers, enabling firms to explore new
ways of organizing their legal businesses. The LSB was designed
to provide proportionate, independent oversight, while approved
regulators, such as the Law Society, The General Council of the
Bar, and councils for specialists such as conveyancers, have
responsibility for day-to-day regulation. Although this is a
continuation of the self-regulation of lawyers, the LSB differs
because it is a government body overseeing the self-regulatory
organizations.
The LSB Chairman and non-executive Board
members are appointed by the Lord Chancellor in consultation
with the Chief Justice. The LSB is accountable to Parliament
through the Lord Chancellor and the Ministry of Justice. 128
The LS Act provides for the licensing of new business
structures or ABSs. An ABS is a firm in which a nonlawyer is a

Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
127 Id.
128 Ministry of Justice, Framework Doc.: Agreement between Ministry of
Justice and Legal Servs. Bd., June 2011, at 8, available at http://www.
legalservicesboard.org.uk/about-us/Isb-frameworkdocument/pdf/moj-frame
workagreement-june_2011.pdf.
125
126
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manager of the firm or has an ownership interest in the firm. Also,
an ABS is a firm where another body is a manager of the firm or
has an ownership interest in the firm. A nonlawyer is a person
who is not authorized to carry out "reserved legal activities." 12 9 In
order for a firm to become an ABS, it must be approved by a
licensing authority such as the LSB or a day-to-day self-regulatory
organization.130
A licensed body must have a Head of Legal Practice who is a
lawyer, and is responsible for ensuring that the firm and its
lawyers comply with duties imposed by the licensing authority
and the LS Act. 131 A licensed body must also have a Head of
Finance and Administration who is responsible for ensuring that
the firm complies with rules made by a licensing body regarding
accounts.132 Further, a licensed body must have arrangements in
place to ensure that lawyers comply with "professional
principles." 3 3 These principles require authorized persons to act
with independence and integrity; to maintain proper work
standards; to act in the best interests of their clients; to comply with
their duties to a court to act with independence in the interests of
justice; and to keep their clients' affairs confidential.134
The
licensing authority must approve each nonlawyer's holding of ten
percent or more of shares in a firm, even if the shares are publicly
traded.135 Such a holder must be a "fit and proper" person and
may not compromise regulatory objectives or the firm's ability to
fulfill duties imposed by the licensing authority.136
The Law Society has set forth the potential benefits and risks of
becoming an ABS.13 7 Advantages include the ability to raise equity
129 See Legal Services Act, supra note 120, at pt. 3, § 12 (defining "'reserved
legal activity"' to include: "(a) the exercise of a right of audience; (b) the conduct
of litigation; (c) reserved instrument activities; (d) probate activities; (e) notarial
activities; [and] (f) the administration of oaths.").
130 Id. at pt. 5, § 73.
131 Id. at pt. 5, § 91.
132 Id. at pt. 5, § 92.
133 Id. at pt. 3, § 17.
134 Id. at pt. 1,§ 1.
135 Id. at sched. 13, pt. 1.
136 Id.
137 Alternative Business Structures Practice Note, THE LAW SOCIETY (May 4,
2011),
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/Advice/Practice-notes/Archive/
Alternative-business-structures/4-May-2011/.
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from a broader base of potential persons, including non-solicitor
employees. 138 Further, equity can be raised from outside the legal
sector without the need for nonlawyer involvement at the
management level so that a wider range of services to clients can
be provided than by a traditional law firm.139 Balanced against
these advantages are potential risks to the firm's culture.140 Also,
many foreign jurisdictions may not accept the ABS model and the
firm may be inhibited in providing services through an overseas
office.141 The level of control of an outside investment and whether
such control could interfere with the firm's ability to act in its
clients' best interests needs to be considered.142 Although ABS
firms are not limited in the services they can provide, an ABS firm
needs to consider whether offering certain services, such as
auditing, might conflict with a duty of confidentiality.14 3 One of
the fears that lawyers express regarding nonlawyer investment in
law firms is that large corporations could own law firms. Such a
development has happened in England, where London-based
WHSmith stores are hosting legal kiosks through a partnership
with QualitySolicitors. Londoners can therefore obtain routine
legal assistance where they buy stationery supplies and
newspapers, in such matters as divorces, wills and real estate
transactions.144
2.2. In Australia
Australia's reform of the legal profession preceded the
England's reform. The Legal Profession Act of 2004 authorized
law firms to incorporate, and also to obtain investments from
nonlawyers.145 Although each state in Australia has its own law
regarding the regulation of lawyers, all have adopted the New
South Wales legislation for "incorporated legal practices" (ILP)
Id.
Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Knake, supra note 19, at 7.
145 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) (Austl.) [hereinafter Legal Profession Act
2004], available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol-act/lpa
138

139

2004179/.
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based on the Model Laws for the Legal Profession promulgated by
the Law Council of Australia in 2004. This development occurred
primarily to increase competition for legal services and secondarily
to create a law-firm structure that would enable partners to have

limited liability. 14 6
The Australian government was interested in applying
competition policy to the legal services industry in order to make
the Australian capital markets attractive in a global economy. 47
The legal profession was interested in obtaining limited liability for
lawyers and an ability to do business in a governance form that
would be more flexible than a traditional general partnership.148
The Australian reform therefore permitted law firms to do business
as multi-disciplinary partnerships, as corporations, and even go
public. In May 2007, Slater & Gordon, an Australian personal
injury litigation law firm, became the first law firm in the world to
make a public offering and then it listed on the Australian stock
exchange (ASX).149

Opponents of the Australian law reform were concerned about
threats to attorneys' ethical duties, especially the duties of
confidentiality, privilege, independence, and competence.1so These
concerns are addressed in the Legal Profession Act. An ILP may
provide legal and other lawful services, have external investors,
and list on the ASX.1st Prior to providing legal services, an ILP
must give written notice to the Law Society of its intention to do
so. 15 2 Additionally, an ILP must comply with the Australian
Federal Corporations Act, and must register with the Australian

146 Justin D. Petzold, Comment, Firm Offers: Are Publicly Traded Law Firms
Abroad Indicative of the Future of the United States Legal Sector?, 2009 WIs. L. REV. 67,
75-76 (2009).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 76.
149 Peter Lattman, Slater & Gordon: The World's First Publicly Traded Law Firm,
WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2007, 9:19 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/
05/22/slater-gordon-the-worlds-first-publicly-traded-law-firm.
150 Petzold, supra note 146, at 78.
151 ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20 Working Group on Alternative Business
Structures, Request for Comment: Issues Paper Concerning Alternative Business
Structures, at 9 (2011) [hereinafter ABA Comm'n on Ethics Request for Cmt of
Apr. 2011], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/ethics 2020/absissues-paper.authcheckdam.pdf.
152 Legal Profession Act 2004, supra note 145, § 137.
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Securities & Investment Commission. 153 An ILP must appoint at
least one legal practitioner who must ensure that appropriate
management systems are implemented and maintained, allowing
the ILP to provide legal services in accordance with the
professional obligations of legal practitioners. 5 4 Although an
incorporated legal practice may engage in non-legal businesses,
where there are conflicts of interest between legal practitioners and
others, the duties of the lawyers trump the interests of third
parties.155
The Slater & Gordon prospectus discusses the firm's regulation
and how it would deal with conflicts of interest. First, it sets forth
its principles of corporate governance as: "fulfilling Slater &
Gordon's duties to the Court and to [its] clients; providing
meaningful employment for employees; providing services of
value to clients; and generating rewards for Shareholders, in a way
that contributes to the welfare of the community."156 Then, the
prospectus explains that if there is a conflict of interest between
those duties, resolution of the conflict will be as follows: "the duty
to the Court will prevail over all other duties; and the duty to the
client will, prevail over the Company's other corporate
responsibilities and duty to shareholders."1 57 Because the ASX
recommends that a majority of the board of a listed company
should be independent directors, the Slater & Gordon board is not
composed of its lawyer-shareholders, and under Australian
regulations pertaining to incorporated law firms, only one director
need be a legal practitioner. Slater & Gordon seems to have
prospered as a publicly traded law firm, and in January 2012, it

153

ABA Comm'n on Ethics Request for Cmt. of Apr. 2011, supra note 151, at

154

Id.
Id.

9.
155

156 SLATER & GORDON LTD., SLATER & GORDON PROSPECTUS § 4.3, 36 (2007),
availableat http://www.slatergordon.com.au/files/editor upload/File/
prospectus/Prospectus.pdf.
157 Id. See also Andrew Grech & Kirsten Morrison, Slater & Gordon: The Listing
Experience, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 535 (2009) (illustrating the ethical and practical
issues that were considered as Slater & Gordon became the first law firm to list its
entire practice on the Australian Stock Exchange).
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purchased the U.K. firm of Russell Jones & Walker and entered the
U.K. legal services market.158
2.3. In Canada
In Canada, certain regulations adopted in three provinces allow
for modified forms of MDP. Two common law provinces, Ontario
and British Columbia, have adopted regulations that permit MDPs,
but with significant restrictions. 159 Quebec, which is a civil law
jurisdiction, has adopted a more liberal MDP regime.160 However,
none of these provinces currently allow for nonlawyer ownership
of law firms.
2.3.1. The CanadianBar Association and the Debate over MDPs in
Canada
In Canada, governance of the legal profession lies within the
provincial Law Societies acting under statute. 161 While the
Canadian Bar Association (CBA) does not regulate the practice of
law, like the ABA, it plays a significant role in developing the
codes of professional conduct.162 In 1997, the CBA established its
International Practice of Law (IPL) Committee to monitor the
"activities, negotiations and developments regarding the
globalization of legal practice and the trend towards multidisciplinary practices through NAFTA, the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and the International Bar Association."1 6 3
The IPL's position on MDPs reversed course three times in a short
period. First, in 1998 the IPL recommended that "MDPs should
158 Slater & Gordon to Enter UK Market With f54m Purchaseof Russell Jones &
Walker, LEGAL FUTURES (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.legalfutures.co./latestnews/ slater-gordon-to-enter-uk-market-with-54m-purchase-of-russell-joneswalker. This combination was approved on April 27, 2012 by the Solicitors
Regulation. Michael Cross, Russell Jones & Walker Approved as ABS, THE LAW
SOCIETY GAZETTE (April 27, 2012), http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/65363.article.
159 ABA Comm'n on Ethics Request for Cmt of Apr. 2011, supra note 151, at
11.
160

Id.

Paul D. Paton, Multidisciplinary PracticeRedux: Globalization, Core Values,
and Reviving the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2193, 2203 (2010).
162 Id. (citing About the Canadian Bar Association, CAN. BAR Ass'N
http://www.cba.org/CBA/about/main).
163 Id. at 2212 (citing Can. Bar Ass'n, Special Comm. On the Int'l Practice of
Law, Multi-Disciplinary Practices: An Interim Report, at ic (1998)).
161
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not be permitted to provide legal services to clients" unless they
were controlled by lawyers.164 However, in August 2000, the IPL
changed its position and the CBA Council approved a "final"
resolution 165 that permitted lawyers to engage in "business
arrangements in which individuals with different professional
qualifications practise together .. . to combine different skills to
provide a broad range of advice to consumers." 66 This resolution
allowed lawyers to participate in MDPs even if such MDPs were
not controlled by lawyers. 167 Additionally, the resolution did not
limit the services that MDPs could provide to services of a legal
nature.168 Then, in a "stark reversal," in February 2001, the CBA
Council "clarified" its earlier resolution with a further resolution
that restricted the MDP regime by requiring that lawyers have
"effective control over the MDP."169 The CBA Council provided
that effective control would ensure that MDPs would be in
"continuing compliance with the core values, ethical and statutory
obligations, standards and rules of professional conduct of the
legal profession."1 70
The CBA's final position seems to have been the product of
"political intrigue and overt manipulation" by the Law Society of
Upper Canada (LSUC), which is the provincial regulator of
Ontario. 171 This is because LSUC had already adopted an MDP
regime significantly more restrictive than the CBA's initial
position.172 Thus,
when it became clear that [LSUC] would be embarrassed by
having the Canadian Bar Association sanction a far more
liberal regime for MDPs than the one that LSUC had
164

Id.

Can. Bar Ass'n, Council Res. 00-03-A (2000).
Can. Bar Ass'n, Int'1 Practice of Law Comm., Striking a Balance: The
Report of the International Practice of Law Committee on Multi-Disciplinary
Practices and the Legal Profession, at 11 (1999).
167 Paton, supra note 161, at 2213.
165
166

168

Id.

169

Can. Bar Ass'n, Council Res. 00-01-M, para. L.a (2000).

170

Id.

Paton, supra note 161, at 2211.
See Law Soc'y of Upper Can., By-Law No. 25 (1999) [hereinafter By-Law
No. 25], available at http://www.1suc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.
aspx?id=2147485895 (describing the by-law behind multi-discipline practices and
partnerships).
171
172
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already imposed while purportedly acting 'in the public
interest,' LSUC representatives embarked on an ultimately
successful campaign through the legal press and at the CBA
itself to have the will of the CBA national counsel reversed
and a narrower MDP regime with a lawyer-control
requirement adopted. 73
2.3.2. Ontario
MDPs have been permitted in Ontario since LSUC adopted ByLaw 25 on April 30, 1999.174 This regulation exists today, in much
its same form, under By-Law 7.175 Part III of By-Law 7 sets forth
the rules governing MDPs in Ontario. A lawyer (licensee) can
form a partnership or other association (but not a corporation) with
a nonlawyer professional "for the purpose of permitting the
licensee to provide to clients the services of the professional" if
certain conditions are met.176 Prior to entering into such an
arrangement, the licensee must apply to LSUC and be approved. 77
The nonlawyer professional must be of good character, and
"qualified to practice a profession, trade or occupation that
supports or supplements the practice of law or the provision of
legal services." 178 Additionally, the licensee must retain "effective
control" over the professional's practice insofar as the professional
is providing services to the clients of the partnership or
association.179 Further, the professional must agree to comply with
Paton, supra note 161, at 2211.
See By-Law No. 25, supra note 172 (stating the by-law behind multidiscipline practices). By-Law No. 25 was "later amended three times in 1999 (May
28, June 25, and December 10), twice in 2001 (April 26 and May 24), and once in
2002 (October 31), but the changes [were] not substantial . .. By-Law [No. 25] was
revoked on May 1, 2007, as part of 'house keeping."' Paton, supra note 161, at
2217 n.106 (internal quotes added). By-Law 25 exists today under By-Law 7. See
id., at 2217 n. 106 (describing the amendments made to By-Law No. 25 and
referencing By-Law No. 7).
175 Law Soc'y of Upper Can., By-Law No. 7, pt. III (2009) [hereinafter By-Law
No. 7], available at http://www.1suc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx
?id=2147485808.
173

174

176

Id.

177

Id.
Id.

178

179 Id. Effective
control requires that "the licensee may, without the
agreement of the professional, take any action necessary to ensure that the
licensee complies with [the society's rules, regulations and policies]."
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the Law Society's rules, regulations and policies, and must agree
not to practice his profession, trade or occupation, except to
provide services to the clients of the partnership or association.18 0
Any independent practice of the professional's occupation must be
performed outside the premises of the partnership or
association.181
In addition, LSUC adopted By-Law 32 on May 24, 2001 to
regulate affiliations between law firms and other service
providers.182 Today, By-Law 32 exists in its original form in Part IV
of By-Law 7, which regulates "affiliated" law firms.183 This
regulation came about due to the "captive law firm model."184 The
concern was with the presence of Donahue & Partners, a law firm
established in Ontario by the accounting firm Ernst & Young, as
well as other law firms "captive" to Big Five accounting firms in
Europe.185
As a result, By-Law 7 imposes a notification
requirement, and various restrictions, on a licensee that "affiliates
with an affiliated entity." 8 6 A licensee "affiliates with an affiliated
entity when the licensee on a regular basis joins with the affiliated
entity in the delivery or promotion and delivery of the services of
the licensee and the services of the affiliated entity."187 A licensee
who is involved in such an arrangement must own and maintain
control over the professional business through which the licensee
practices law or provides legal services. 8 8 Additionally, there
must be a physical segregation of the premises from which the
legal services are delivered from those used by the affiliated entity
for the delivery of its nonlegal services, "other than those that are
delivered by the affiliated entity jointly with the delivery of the

180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Law Soc'y of Upper Can., By-Law No. 32 (2001), repealed 2007, available at
Byhttp://www.1suc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147485902.
Law No. 32 was repealed on May 1, 2007 and exists today under By-Law No. 7, pt.
IV. See Paton,supra note 161, at 2220-21 n.125.
183 By-Law No. 7, supra note 175, at pt. IV.
184 Paton, supra note 161, at 2220.
185 Id., at 2220.
186 By-Law No. 7, supra note 175, at pt. IV (2009).

187 Id.
188

Id.
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services of the licensee."189 Finally, no fee splitting or profit
sharing is permitted between the law firm and the affiliated
entity.190
2.3.3. British Columbia
In 2001, The Law Society of British Columbia (LSBC)
contemplated a much more liberal regime than the one adopted in
Ontario. In fact, the governors of the LSBC (benchers) rejected a
more restrictive approach stating: "A restrictive approach may
preclude sensible and economic arrangements between lawyers
and members of other occupations that may serve the public
well."191 However, although these proposed rule changes received
a majority of the bencher's votes, a two-thirds majority was
necessary to adopt the resolution.192 As a result the resolution was
rejected in order to protect the "core values" of the profession as
well as what the benchers called a "lack of demand within the
profession for such a regulatory scheme."193 The LSBC did not
adopt any MDP regime until 2010 when it adopted Rules 2-23.1 to
2-23.12 into its practice rules. 94
The rules adopted by LSBC function in much the same way as
MDPs in Ontario. For example, the lawyer member of the MDP
must obtain express permission by the LSBC to enter into a
MDP.195 The nonlawyer members of the MDP must be of "good

189 Id. Further, it requires notification to the board and an annual filing that
must include information on the financial arrangement that exists between the
lawyer and the affiliated entity, as well as other arrangements including the
ownership, management, control, and compliance with the rules, regulations and
policies of the society.
190 LAW Soc'Y OF UPPER CANADA, RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 2.08(9) (2001).
191The Law Soc'y of B.C., Consultation on Multi-Disciplinary Practice,
BENCHERS' BULL., no. 1, July-Aug. 2001 Supp., http://www.lawsociety.bc.
ca/page.cfm?cid=1904.
192 Paton, supranote 161, at 2225.
193 The Law Soc'y of B.C., Benchers Say No to Multi-Disciplinary Practice,
BENCHERS' BULL., no. 6, Nov.-Dec. 2001 Supp., http://www.awsociety.
bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=1854&t=Benchers-s.
194 THE LAW SOC'Y OF B.C., LAW SOCIETY Rs. §§ 2-23.1-2-23.12 (2009), available
at https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=979&t=Law-Society-Rules-Part2-Membership-and-Authority-to-Practise-Law#2-23-1 [hereinafter LSBC PRACTICE
RULES].
195 Id. § 2-23.2(1)(b).
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character and repute." 196 Additionally, all members must agree in
writing that the lawyer members of the MPD will have actual
control over the delivery of legal services, and that nonlawyer
members will not interfere with the lawyer's obligation to the rules
regulations and polices of the LSBC.19w
In October 2011, the LSBC requested that the Independence
and Self-Governance Committee ("Committee") examine the
debate surrounding alternative business structures (including
models with outside ownership) and outline their views on
whether or not they should be adopted in British Columbia.198 The
Committee expressed their concern about "the lack of empirical
evidence given by proponents of ABSs, and believes that if the only
demonstrable effect of ABSs was to enrich the legal profession or
those who invested in it, the image of the profession and the Law
Society would be tarnished."199 Thus, the Committee urged that:
some considerable caution needs to be exercised to ensure
that there is a public value in ABSs (such as improving
access to legal services) and that valuable public protections
that currently exist (such as client confidentiality, an
absence of conflicts of interest, and the public right to an
independent lawyer) are not lost.200
The Committee concluded that "some outside ownership
involvement in law firms could be considered, provided it is
properly regulated and that lawyers remain in control of the
However, the
provision of the legal services offered." 201
Committee rejected the notion that law firms be put up for public
sale through securities markets, because they were "not convinced
that there are benefits to users of legal services that outweigh
identified risks." 202 Although the Committee recommended that
Id. § 2-23.2(1)(c).
197 Id. § 2-23.2(1)(d).
198 The Law Soc'y of B.C., Alternative Business Structures in the Legal
Profession: Preliminary Discussion and Recommendations (2011), available at
http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/publications/reports/AltemativeBusinessStr
uctures.pdf.
196

199 Id. at 1.
201

Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.

202

Id.

200
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the LSBC give "serious consideration to ABSs," they suggested that
the LSBC wait and see what happens elsewhere: "The [LSBC]
should await the outcome of the debate currently underway
through the American Bar Association." 203
2.3.4. Quebec
In Quebec, the Code des professions (Professional Code) was
amended with regulations in 2010 to provide for a more liberal
MDP regime than that which exists in Ontario and British
Columbia. 204 The regulations in Quebec require only a "simple
majority ownership by members of the Barreau du Quebec of the
firm through which the professional services are provided." 205
Membership of non laywers is:
restricted to those members of various other recognized
professional bodies (including actuaries, patent agents, and
members of the Chambre de l'assurance de dommages)
[damage insurance adjusters and brokers] or the Chambre
de la securite financiere [financial planners and insurance
agents], but the regulation does not require that their
activities 'support or supplement the practice of law' in the
manner of the Ontario and British Columbia MDP rules.206
MDPs are required to:
provide an undertaking to the Barreau du Quebec that in
essence ensures that all members of the partnership comply
with rules of law so as to permit the lawyer members to
carry on their professional activities, particularly as regards
the following:
a) professional secrecy, the confidentiality of information
contained in client files and the preservation thereof;
b) professional independence;
Id.
See QUEBEC PROF'L CODE (2014), available
at http://www2.
publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=2&file=/
C_26/C26_A.HTM; Ethics Comm'n Request for Cmt. of April 2011, supra note 27,
at 12.
205 Ethics Comm'n Request for Cmt. of April 2011, supra note 27, at 12.
206 Id. at 12 (translations in original) (footnote omitted).
203
204
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c) the prevention of situations of conflict of interests;
d) activities reserved for advocates;
e) liability insurance;
f) professional inspections;
g) advertising;
h) billing and trust accounts; and
i) access by the syndic of the Barreau to this undertaking
and, if applicable, to every contract or agreement regarding
a [member of the Barreau].207

2.4. Other Jurisdictions
Jurisdictions in addition to England, Australia, and Canada
have been considering whether to permit multidisciplinary
practices and ownership of interests in law firms by nonlawyers.
In particular, various European countries are studying whether to
liberalize restrictions on the practice of law. France, Spain, and
Scotland have studies or proposals in this regard. 208
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") released a report in 2007 questioning the regulation of
the legal profession.209 This report asserted that regulation and
self-regulation of the legal profession appear "to serve mainly the
private interests of the profession rather than broader consumer
interests." 210 The report found the restrictions.on ownership and
management of law firms difficult to justify because these
restrictions limit the available sources of capital for a law firm and
because spreading the risk by allowing more widespread
Also, prohibiting
ownership could reduce prices to clients.
and innovative
more
efficient
nonlawyer management may "stifle
211 Further, the
methods of delivering legal services to consumers."
OECD rejected the argument that financial control of law firms by
207

Id. at 13 (citing QUEBEC PROF'L CODE Sched. B (s.3)).

Cox, supranote 4, at 538-39.
OECD, COMPETITIVE RESTRICTIONS IN LEGAL PROFESSIONS (2007), available at
http://www.oecd.org/regreform/liberalisationandcompetitioninterventioninreg
ulatedsectors/40080343.pdf.
210 Id. at 9.
211 Id. at 50.
208

209
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nonlawyers would improperly influence lawyers by putting
commercial interests ahead of client interests "since lawyers are
not less driven by profits than their commercial counterparts." 2 12
This OECD Report seems to have had a greater impact in Europe
than elsewhere, but the United States is a member of the OECD
and so its views regarding competition should be heeded.
3.

THE JACOBY AND MEYERS LITIGATION

On May 18, 2011, Jacoby & Meyers, LLP (Plaintiffs) filed a
complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York against the Presiding Justices of the First, Second, Third
and Fourth Departments of the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of the State of New York (N.Y. Defendants), challenging
ABA Rule 5.4 and its state law counterparts on a variety of
constitutional grounds. 213 The Plaintiffs challenged Rule 5.4 of the
New York Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits lawyers
from practicing law for profit in an entity in which a nonlawyer
has an ownership interest. The Plaintiffs filed a similar complaint
on the same day against the Justices of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey (N.J. Defendants) in the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey 214 and against the Judges of the Connecticut Superior
Court of the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. 2 15
In their original New York Complaint, Plaintiffs set forth a
lengthy list of reasons why Rule 5.4 is antiquated and should be
changed. First, the rule prevents law firms from competing in
today's global marketplace, restricts public access to "affordable,
quality representation," and impedes law firms' ability to "raise
the capital necessary to pay for improvements in technology and
infrastructure, and to expand its offices and hire additional
personnel." 216 The traditional modes of obtaining capital - through

212

Id.

Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of First, Second, Third &
Fourth Depts., Appellate Div. of Supreme Court of New York, 847 F. Supp. 2d 590
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
214 Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, LLP v. Justices of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey, No. 11-cv-2866-JAP (D.N.J. filed May 18, 2011).
215 Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, LLP v. Judges of the Connecticut Superior
Court, No. 3:11-cv-00817-CFD (D. Conn. filed May 18, 2011).
216 Complaint at para. 1, Jacoby & Meyers, 847 F. Supp. 2d 590 (No. 11 Civ.
3387).
213
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personal contributions of the partners and commercial bank
loans-are unavailable to firms like Jacoby & Meyers and,
although the firm has had capital contribution offers from
nonlawyer investors, it has been unable to take advantage of such
offers due to the prohibitions of Rule 5.4.217
Second, the current ethical system "perpetuates economic
inequity" between small law firms with no access to the capital
markets, and those on Wall Street, as well as between Wall Street
firms and firms in England and Australia, where lawyers are
allowed to accept funding from nonlawyers. 218 In England and
Australia, there are alternative safeguards in place to ensure that
nonlawyer equity investors do not interfere with lawyers'
professional responsibilities, and the system has worked well in
both countries. 219
Third, one need only look to the practice of the District of
Columbia, where lawyers may partner with nonlawyers, to see that
the restrictions of Rule 5.4 are unwarranted. No "violation of
clients' confidences" or "erosion of lawyers' independent
judgment" in D.C has ever occurred. 220 Indeed, "the claimed evils
most often advanced by critics of outside, nonlawyer
investment ... have not materialized in the wake of others' efforts
to allow such outside investments." 2 21 Finally, Rule 5.4 should no
longer be enforced because "no compelling legal argument or
public policy rationale exists to prevent lawyers from raising
capital in the same manner as any other business." 222
Because of these reasons, Plaintiffs' first Complaint sought to
enjoin the enforcement of Rule 5.4 against them and other similarly
situated law firms, and a declaration that the Rule violates: (1) the
Judiciary Law, (2) the Dormant Commerce Clause, (3) the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses, (4) Plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights to free speech and association, and (5) that the
Rule constitutes a regulatory taking without compensation. 223

Id. at para. 28.
Id. at para. 4.
219 Id. at para. 33.
220 Id. at para. 5.
221 Id.
222 Id. at para. 6.
217

218

m
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The New York Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the
Complaint on July 15, 2011, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). During the oral argument
held before Judge Kaplan on February 7, 2012, the Court stated that
Plaintiffs "faced a significant uphill battle to establish standing,"
but that Plaintiffs' claims were ripe and that the Court "should
entertain the case rather than abstain."224 Afterwards, Plaintiffs
were granted leave to amend their complaint to correct certain
procedural defects. On November 23, 2011, Plaintiffs filed an
Amended Complaint, naming Jacoby & Meyer USA, LLC, as an
additional Plaintiff, and thus rendered the Defendant's first Motion
to Dismiss moot.22 5
The Amended Complaint reiterated the same policy arguments
against Rule 5.4 as discussed above and stated that Jacoby &
Meyers, LLP, had recently created the LLC, Jacoby & Meyers USA,
"for the express purpose of allowing nonlawyers to 'own an
interest' in the entity through which Jacoby & Meyers is authorized
to practice law for profit." 226 Plaintiffs stated that Jacoby & Meyers,
LLP, was immediately prepared "to transfer all of its assets to
Jacoby & Meyers USA, LLC and immediately obtain nonlawyer
investment-as soon as Rule 5.4's blanket suppression of
nonlawyer ownership of an interest in law firms is declared
unconstitutional and its enforcement permanently enjoined." 227 In
this way, the New York Defendants could no longer claim that
Plaintiffs' inability to add a nonlawyer partner to their firm was
barred by New York State Partnership Law, since their newly
created entity was a LLC not subject to Partnership Law. 2 28

224 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 1, Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of
First, Second, Third & Fourth Depts., Appellate Div. of Supreme Court of New
York, 847 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 3387) [hereinafter
Memorandum in Suppprt to Dismiss].
2 Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at para. 14,
Jacoby & Meyers, 847 F. Supp. 2d.
226 Id.
227

Id.

228 Defendants argued in their first Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiffs had no

standing to sue because New York State Partnership Law, not Rule 5.4, prevented
them from adding a nonlawyer partner to their firm. See Memorandum in
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On December 23, 2011, the New York Defendants moved to
The bulk of the parties' arguments
dismiss the complaint.
concerned the procedural and jurisdictional aspects of Plaintiffs'
claims, and the defendants chose to address standing, ripeness,
immunity, and abstention. On March 8, 2012, Judge Kaplan issued
a decision holding that Plaintiffs did not have standing to raise the
constitutional claims advanced in their complaint because they are
a limited liability company and a limited liability partnership, and,
as such, are a "corporation or voluntary association" within the
meaning of Section 495 of the New York Judiciary Law. 229 This
decision bars the Plaintiffs from obtaining nonlawyer ownership
equity independently of Rule 5.4.230 As such, Plaintiffs had no
standing to bring this suit and, because "the ruling that they seek
would be a purely advisory declaration of the sort that is forbidden
to federal courts under Article III of the U.S. Constitution," the
action was dismissed. 231 Accordingly, the Court did not address
the merits of Plaintiffs' claims against the New York Defendants.
The Plaintiffs appealed the District Court decision, and on
November 21, 2012, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded
the case to the District Court and instructed the lower court to
vacate the original judgment and allow the Plaintiffs to amend
their complaint. 232 The Second Circuit opinion stated that "the
district court can proceed to adjudicate the parties' dispute as to
whether [Section 495 of the N~w York Judiciary Law, Section 201 of
New York LLC Law] and Rule 5.4 are constitutional." 233 As a
result, the merits of the Plaintiffs' claims will ultimately be
addressed by the New York Court.
Judge Sheridan took a different approach in the New Jersey
case, where the New Jersey Defendants also made a motion to
dismiss. He held that it was best for the Court to restrain its
authority in light of the rightful independence of the New Jersey

Suppprt to Dismiss, supra note 224, at 5 (stating that the Partnership Law
precludes the hiring of a nonlawyer at a law firm).
229 Jacoby & Meyers, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 597.
230 Id. at 591-92.
231 Id.
232 Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of First, Second, Third &
Fourth Dep'ts, App. Div. of Sup. Ct. of State of N.Y., 488 F. App'x 526 (2d Cir.
2012), as amended (Jan. 9, 2013).
233 Id. at 527.
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Supreme Court over Rule 5.4(d), and therefore he denied the
motion to dismiss and remitted the issue of an Alternative Business
Structure, as proposed by Jacoby & Meyers, to the New Jersey
Supreme Court. 234
A motion to dismiss in Connecticut by the Connecticut
defendants has not yet been decided.
Whether any rights protected either by the U.S. Constitution or
the constitutions of the States of New York, New Jersey, or
Connecticut are abridged by the prohibition against partnerships
or other forms of business organizations that include both lawyers
and nonlawyers are complicated issues. For obvious political
reasons, federal district court judges would rather not decide these
questions in cases against state judges. Whether the U.S. Supreme
Court might entertain these cases is another question. 235
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,23 6 the Supreme Court struck
down suggested minimum fees for legal services imposed by the
Virginia State Bar. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 237 the Supreme
Court struck down bans against lawyer advertising as contrary to
the First Amendment. In NAACP v. Button,238 the Supreme Court
held that the states could not ban the delivery of legal services
through a nonprofit corporation.
This precedent was then
extended to permit unions to offer legal services to their
members. 239 In Citizens United v. FEC,240 the Supreme Court held
that the Government may not suppress political speech by

234 Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, LLP v. Justices of Sup. Ct. of N.J., (No. 112866) (D.N.J. filed May 18, 2011).
235 Seemingly independent of its pending litigation in U.S. federal
courts,
Jacoby & Meyers announced in August 2013 its participation in a joint venture
with a U.K. firm in order to create "the world's largest privately-owned, fullservice consumer legal group" to be based in the United Kingdom. Jacoby &
Meyers Builds Platform in the U.K. for a Global Build-Out, JACOBY & MEYERS LAW
OFFICES (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.jacobymeyers.com/blog/jacoby-meyersbuilds-platform-uk-global-build-out.html.
The new firm, Jacoby & Meyers
Europe Limited, will be owned by Jacoby & Meyers, LLP, and affiliated with MJ
Hudson. Id. Going forward, the firm expects to seek ABS status in the United
Kingdom to solicit for nonlawyer equity ownership and funding. Id.
236 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
2
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
238 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
2
United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
240 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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corporations. Whether these cases and some related decisions
amount to a theory that the First Amendment's protections of
speech, assembly, and association make state prohibitions on
business combinations between lawyers and nonlawyers
unconstitutional has been argued by some 241 and opposed by
others. 242
The ABA appears to have determined that organizations that
do not operate at a profit can provide legal services, but for profit
entities cannot do so if they profit from these services. 243 Recently,
many states have made provision for the incorporation of benefit
and flexible purpose corporations, which straddle a space between
for-profit and non-profit corporations. The benefit corporation
commits its owners to pursue social or philanthropic objectives,
although shareholder profits may also be pursued. However, there
is no obligation to give shareholders priority. 244 Flexible purpose
corporations similarly would allow customers, the community, or
society to trump shareholder interests. 245 If the bar were more
serious about protecting professional values over protecting
economic interests, it might consider adapting these corporate
forms to law firms so that law firms could join with nonlawyers
either as shareholders or in other capacities, but client interests
would nevertheless trump shareholder interests. This proposition
is similar to the way in which the regulation of law firms evolved
in Australia.
Jacoby & Meyers did not sue for relief under the antitrust laws.
At one time there was thought to be a "learned profession"

241 See Knake, supra note 19 (arguing that current restrictions on nonlawyer
ownership of law firms may be unjustified); Gary A. Munneke, Dances with
Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law Firm Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 559
(1992).
242 Brief for Conn. Bar Ass'n. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants at 2,
Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices v. Justices of Sup. Ct. of N.J., No. 11-cv-2866 (D.N.J.
filed May 18, 2011) (No. 11-cv-00817).
243 See Andrews, supra note 58, at 589-90 (arguing that this distinction
prevents the potential harms envisioned by opponents of allowing nonlawyer
ownership of law firms).
244 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14620(d) (West 2011) (codifying this lack of
shareholder priority); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1707(a)(1)-(3) (McKinney 2011)
(codifying this lack of shareholder priority).
245 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602 (West 2011) (providing an example of flexible
purpose corporation and its unique guidelines).
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exemption from the antitrust laws, 246 but the Supreme Court
rejected this concept in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.24 7
Nevertheless, in an earlier case, Parker v. Brown, 248 the Court
adopted the "state action" exemption from the antitrust laws in
situations where state regulation required conduct the antitrust
laws prohibited. This doctrine has generally protected legal ethics
from attacks under the antitrust laws, except in cases involving
blatant price fixing. 249
The restraint against nonlawyer and lawyer association in a
law firm is a standard of a voluntary non-governmental
organization, the ABA, and therefore is not sovereign action.
Nevertheless, this ban has been adopted by state bar associations,
and generally is approved and enforced by the state courts.
Whether this acceptance should make any difference is an
interesting question, but it seems pertinent that the restrictions
against equity investment in law firms by nonlawyers was
abolished in England and Australia on antitrust grounds. In a
different context, involving the membership rules of the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), the U.S. Supreme Court held that an
implied repeal of the antitrust laws by the federal securities laws
existed only to the extent necessary to make securities regulation
work.250 A similar rationale could perhaps be applied to Rule 5.4
of the ABA and the states that have adopted it. In other words, are
these bans necessary to protect the core values of the legal
profession or could these values be protected in other, less anticompetitive ways?
4.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY

Lawyers make much of their professionalism, but "to term
them noncommercial is sanctimonious humbug." 251 Further, other
246 Thomas D. Morgan, The Impact of Antitrust Law on the Legal Profession,
67
FORDHAM L. REV. 415, 419 (1998).

247

421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).

317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
See Morgan, supra note 246, at 423-27, 436-39 (discussing various
scenarios where antitrust law would apply to law firms; including, price fixing,
lawyer arranged boycotts, and conspiracies between law firms relating to
advertising practices).
250 Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
251 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 368 n.19 (1977) (citing
Transcript of Oral Argument at 64).
248

249
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industries have confronted the problem of eliminating restrictions
on their form of organization and financing. In this part, this
Article will discuss the elimination of such restrictions on securities
firms that were members of the NYSE and the NYSE itself. While
the results of these changes in the organizational form of these
firms have been both beneficial and detrimental, if lawyers find
that alternative business structures are necessary, they will push
for the abolition of absolute bans on lawyer-nonlawyer
associations.
Until 1953, only individuals could be members of the NYSE,
and all exchange member firms were required to do business as
partnerships. Further, all member firms were required to be
primarily engaged in a public securities business. 252 The rationale
for these regulations was related to the mutual form of exchange
organization. When making a trade, an exchange member had to
be trusted to stand behind the trade. 253 Because all partners are
liable for the debts of a partnership, the personal wealth of every
firm partner guaranteed stock exchange trading contracts. This
regime worked reasonably well when commission rates were fixed
and all orders in exchange listed stocks were required to be
executed over an exchange. 254 In addition to contributing to the
financial stability of the NYSE, these regulations kept institutions,
which were the customers of exchange members, from becoming
exchange members. 255
After the paperwork crisis on Wall Street in the 1960s, and the
unfixing of stock exchange commission rates in 1975, it became
apparent that the traditional regime of the brokerage firm
partnership form was doomed. In the 1960s, over 150 securities
firms failed. 256 In addition to the problems unleashed by the
252 See PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 720 (3d Cir. 1973)
(discussing the application of the "'institutional membership' rule" to all members
of the exchange); ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION By PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 118-20 (1982) (explaining that
this regulatory scheme provided for the self-policing of the finacial industry).
253 See Jay F. Coughenour & Daniel N. Deli, Liquidity Provision and the
OrganizationalForm of NYSE Specialist Firms, 57 J.FIN. 841, 844 (2002).
2m KARMEL, supra note 252, at 129-31.
255 See Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 375 (1st Cir. 1971) (reasoning that since
"all brokers, to be members, must be engaged primarily in brokerage" the
defendants "would not have been able to qualify for membership").
256 CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 296 (1997).
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unfixing of brokerage commissions in the next decade, the
structure of the underwriting business was challenged, and sales
and trading with institutional customers became more important
even to the wire houses. 257
In 1953, the NYSE allowed its member firms to incorporate.
Woodcock Hess & Co. and A.G. Becker & Co. were the first to do
so and remain member firms. 258 In 1959, Merrill Lynch, Pierce
Fenner & Smith, a large, nationwide wire house catering to retail
customers, incorporated. 259 Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, a firm
that catered to institutional customers by executing their trades,
also incorporated in 1959, and then it became a public company in
1971.260
Merrill Lynch soon followed with an initial public
offering. These offerings were in response to a 1970 relaxation of
the rules of the NYSE allowing member firms to go public. 261
These changes occurred because of the greatly increased need
for capital required to run a securities business, and the financial
needs of the securities industry generally. 262 The number of
customers and the volume of trading greatly increased, and firms
were required to invest large amounts of money in computerizing
their back offices. The partnership form of business organization
could not raise sufficient capital to support the business of large
firms. Subordinated loans, which were counted as regulatory
capital, were not a viable long-term solution to business needs.263
The problems of partnership succession and the unwieldy nature
257

J.P.

Id. at 297-98.

258 JERRY W. MARKHAM, 2 A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM
MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1900-1970) 292 (2002).

259 Michael J. Kaufman, Living in A Material World: Strict Liability Under Rule
1Ob-5, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 67 (1990).
260 CHARLES R. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS: INSIDE THE GREAT WALL STREET
MONEY DYNASTIES 226-27 (2001).
261 Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr. The Demise of InvestmentBanking Partnerships:Theory and Evidence 31 (Oxford Centre, Working Paper, 2004),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=569109 (noting
how the NYSE amended its rules in 1970 to admit publicly quoted members).
262 See GEISST, supra note 260, at 206-07, 227-28 (articulating how the
changing financial landscape required firms to go public in order to meet their
capital demands).
263 See CHRIS WELLES, THE LAST DAYS OF THE CLUB 153-54 (1975). Several
prospectus for brokerage firm public offerings stated that the proceeds of the
offering would be used to retire subordinated loans. Under stock exchange rules,
these loans could not be repaid if repayment would jeopardize a firm's
compliance with net capital regulations.
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of large securities firm partnerships also contributed to the need to
incorporate and then go public.264
Not all NYSE member firms incorporated and went public
even when such an organization was allowed. Goldman Sachs
remained a partnership until 1999, and was able to do so because it
was enormously profitable, and it compelled partners to leave
capital in the firm.2 65 Lazard Freres chose to remain a partnership
for even longer, but eventually went public in May of 2005.266
The impetus for going public was the need for capital.
"Without adequate equity capital on their books, the investment
banks could not underwrite enough deals or make their influence
felt on Wall Street. . . . Even when the firms had surplus capital,
their futures were still not certain because, as their partners retired,
they withdrew their capital, shrinking the firms' financial bases." 267
Another theory, espoused by Professors Morrison and Wilhelm,
regarding the transformation of securities firm partnerships into
large public corporations is that going public was a response to
"technological innovations in both information technology and
finance." 268
According to this theory, "[p]artnerships will not make capital
investments when the costs of idle capital are sufficiently large: the
going public decision therefore boils down to a trade-off between
investment in human and physical capital." 269 In the 1960s, the
increase in computer power allowed certain types of securities
firms to substitute computers "for human capital in .

.

. settling

mailing
maintaining client balances, [and]
transactions,
confirmations . . . ."270 Retail rather than wholesale firms took
advantage of the opportunity to go public at this time. Later, the
development of the microcomputer led to financial engineering
and the creation of new products that decreased the bid/ask

264 See GEISST, supra note 260, at 226 (explaining how aging partners draw
capital from the firm upon retirement).
265 Id. at 307-10 (noting the pressures Goldman faced to go public even
though it remained a profitable firm).
266 See LAZARD LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2005 Form 10-K (2006) (detailing the
organization's finances as a public company).
267 GEISST, supranote 260, at 314-15.
268 Morrison & Wilhelm, supra note 261, at 2.
269 Id. at 4.
270 Id.
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spread, and therefore the wholesale firms needed additional
financial capital and went public. 271 For both retail and wholesale
firms, competitive pressures to expand pushed them into
becoming public companies, thereby substituting financial capital
for human capital. 272
Although the above thesis has some appeal, it is an incomplete
analysis of why securities firms went public. An examination of
the "Use of Proceeds" section of some of the early initial public
offerings reflects that firms were concerned about the expected
deregulation of stock exchange commission rates and increased
capital requirements of their regulators. 273
Although this
explanation for the public offerings of wire houses fits to some
extent into the Morrison and Wilhelm thesis, the prospectus for the
initial public offering of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette stated that
proceeds from the offering would be used to support the firm's
block positioning activities, a business in which Goldman Sachs
was also prominent. However, Goldman Sachs did not go public
until much later.
The same economic pressures that led to the breakdown of the
partnership form of organization for securities firms also led to the
demutualization and public company status of the NYSE. The
NYSE incorporated in 1971, although the SEC was concerned that
this step would impair the effectiveness of the exchange as a selfregulatory organization (SRO).274 Nevertheless, the exchange
continued to operate as a mutual organization for the benefit of its
members until 2003, when scandals involving the chairman of the
exchange and stock exchange specialists led to a board
reorganization that positioned the exchange for a public offering. 275

271 Id. at 5.
272

Id. at 31-32.

273 See, e.g., BACHE & CO., INC., PROSPECTUS FOR 2,500,000 SHARES OF COMMON
STOCK 3-4, 8-9 (1971); MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., PROSPECTUS
FOR 4,000,000 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK 4, 10-11 (1971).
274 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9112, 1971 SEC LEXIS 98 (Mar. 17,
1971) (reporting how the commission asked for consideration regarding the
potential conflict between limiting liability for members and still being an
effective self-regulatory organization).
275 See
Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 151,
164-65 (2008) (noting how scandals involving the chairman and CEO of the NYSE
led to doubts about its self-regulatory capacities and long-term viability).
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The exchange then went public through a reverse merger with
Archipelago Holdings, Inc., thus sidestepping long negotiations
with the SEC with respect to a public offering that the NASD went
through. 276 This suited powerful members of the securities
industry, which had invested large sums in electronic trading
networks and wished to break up the NYSE's quasi-monopoly on
trading listed securities.277
As a result of the incorporation and public offerings of NYSE
member firms and the NYSE itself, the securities industry has
expanded and become part of the banking industry. Although this
has enabled U.S. firms to compete with foreign universal banks,
there is a serious question as to whether this growth has been
beneficial to the capital markets. The financial meltdown of 2008
and the resulting reduction in the number of large U.S. banks that
are players in the global markets may be the end game in the
restructuring of the securities industry that began with the
transformation of securities firms from partnerships to giant toobig-to-fail banks. Similarly, the fragmentation of the securities
markets into fifty or more trading venues 278 is the result of the
destruction of the NYSE specialist system, which operated as a
mutual company. Although these developments can be looked
upon as the creative destruction of a capitalist system, many
wonder whether the giant banks should be broken up, and also
whether new regulation for the trading markets is necessary to
alleviate the occurrence of "flash crashes." 279
Id. at 165.
277 See id. at 167-68 ("some small broker-dealers who were not NYSE
members brought a lawsuit alleging that their interests had been overrun by the
large NYSE member firms.").
278 See Rachelle Younglai & Jonathan Spicer, U.S. Probes Trading Practices in
Fragmented Markets, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2010, 7:04 PM)), http://www.reuters.
com/article/2010/12/09/ us-financial-regulation-marketsidUSTRE6B714820101209 (reporting that a congressional hearing listed "lack of
surveillance" of these entities as a problem to address to avoid a future "flash
crash").
279 Id.
See also, e.g., Sebastian Mallaby, Breaking Up the Banks Will Win
Investors' Approval, FIN. TIMEs, July 18, 2012, at 9 ("If regulators want a 'reasonable'
policy that will be accepted by the equity market, they should break up the giant
banks."); Sandy Weill Stages an Epic Conversion - Better to Restore Glass-Steagall Than
a Weak Volcker Rule, FIN. TIMES, July 27, 2012, at 8 ("Now all of a sudden Sandy
Weill, . . . a driving force behind the abolition of the Glass-Steagall act, is calling
for a return to status quo ante."). But see Art Johnson, Proposals to Break Up Big
Banks Threaten All Banks, AM. BANKER (Aug. 1, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://www.
276
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It is important to note that the securities industry is no longer
self-regulated, except with regard to the regulatory oversight of
brokerage firms by FINRA. 280 This regulation primarily relates to
responsibilities of broker-dealers to their customers. The NYSE is
no longer a significant regulator, since it transferred most of its
regulatory responsibilities to FINRA, and the largest securities
firms became bank holding companies during the 2008 financial
crisis and are now regulated primarily by the Federal Reserve
Board.
5.

THE FUTURE OF LAW FIRMS

The author has grave concerns about the present structure of
the securities industry and the capital markets, 281 and is not
advocating that law firms traverse a similar path.
Endless
expansion in response to decreased profitability of core businesses
is not necessarily a public benefit. Nevertheless, if Big Law begins
to feel competitive pressures to reduce rates and costs and at the
same time to expand, and it needs capital in order to do so, it is
likely that the ethics rules preventing nonlawyer ownership of
firms will erode. It is also possible that smaller firms or innovative
organizations trying to serve low-income clients could upend Rule
5.4.282 Until now, law firms have financed growth and operations
through capital investments by their partners and loans from
banks and other sources. But these sources of funding require

americanbanker.com/bankthink/ proposals-to-break-up-big-banks-threaten-allbanks-1051477-1.html ("[A]n attempt to break up the large banks would hurt each
and every one of us."); Steven Rattner, Regulate, Don't Split Up, Huge Banks, N.Y.
TIMES (July 31, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/01/opinion/sanfordweills-glass-steagall-distraction.html? r=0 ("Good management will always be
more effective in avoiding bad outcomes than legislation.
280 Roberta Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory OrganizationsBe
Considered Government Agencies?, 14 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 151 (2008).
281 See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a
Model for Breaking Up the Banks That Are Too-Big-To-Fail?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 821
(2011).
282 See Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (W.D. Mo. 2011)
(adjudicating a class action lawsuit for unauthorized practice of law against
LegalZoom, a small business that produced legal documents for customers who
filled out the forms themselves via an online portal). Although LegalZoom was
held to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by providing legal
documents over the Internet for do-it-yourself clients, and then editing them,
providing the legal documents was held not to be practicing law. Id.
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large outlays. Greenberg Traurig recently made a capital call on its
partners for $24 million.283 Dewey & LeBoeuf was bankrupted by
its large bank loans, and it was not the first law firm to find itself in
such a difficult situation. 284 Firms that distribute 100% of their
profits rather than holding back partnership capital for investment
can face the same pressures that caused Dewey to collapse. 285
Like the securities firms of the 1960s and 1970s, law firms have
discovered that some of the legal work previously done by
associates can either be consigned to computers or outsourced to
less expensive lawyers. Though it is unlikely that computers will
be able to argue cases before a jury, they are doing much of the
If technology
discovery work previously done by humans.
becomes more important in the provision of legal services, and
requires large capital outlays by firms, or if law firms become
capital hungry for other reasons, law firms may well follow the
path of investment banking firms and give up the advantages of
the partnership form. Furthermore, is a law firm of 1,000 partners
really an old fashioned general partnership or it simply a big
business in partnership form?2 86 Because of the LLP form of
professional organization, not all partners are even liable any
longer for the debts or malpractice of their putative partners.
Neither are they paid in lock step arrangements. These firms are
corporations in all but name, with centralized management and
hierarchical arrangements. Some law firms would undoubtedly
benefit from professional business management by nonlawyers.
My thesis is that sooner or later law firms will be allowed to
raise equity capital, and the bar should prepare for this eventuality
instead of denying it is a possibility. This could happen as the
result of one state deciding that it will facilitate such a process,

283 Debra Cassens Weiss, Greenberg TraurigAsks Partnersto Pony Up More Cash
in $24M Capital Call, ABA J. (Aug. 8, 2012, 6:19 AM), http://www.abajournal.
com/news/article/greenberg-traurig-asks-partnersjtopony-up-more cash in
24m.capital call.
284 Rich Smith, How Dewey & LeBoeuf Became the Biggest Law Firm Bankruptcy
Ever, DAILY FIN. (June 15, 2012, 10:37 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/
2012/06/15/a-bankruptcy-you-might-applaud-bye-bye-dewey-and-leboeuf/.
285 Paul Lippe, Is Your Firm Playing 'Dewey Roulette'?, ABA J. (Aug. 15, 2012,
1:52 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/dewey-roulette/.
286 Cf Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 78-79 (1984) (reversing
both district court and appellate court judgments to conclude that Title VII applies
to the selection of candidates to a law firm partnership).
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through legislation or action of the judiciary, or the Supreme Court
or a state high court holding that current rules of legal ethics are
uncompetitive or unconstitutional. Alternatively, the Department
of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission could instigate action
to revoke anti-competitive ABA rules. 28 7 Should this happen, selfregulation will be affected, as it was in the securities industry when
investment firms and exchanges went publiC288 and in England
when ethical rules were changed to permit equity investments in
law firms. Lawyers are already not entirely self-regulated, as some
government oversight by the SEC was imposed by SarbanesOxley. 289 Further, certain earmarks of lawyer professionalism,
particularly independence and the duty of confidentiality, would
need to be safeguarded or they could be lost. Considering how to
preserve these values in the face of dynamic and changing business
models for law firms is a large task that was initially embarked
upon, but not completed, by the ABA Ethics Commission. Sooner
or later, however, the legal profession will need to confront how to
preserve its core values in the face of global competition and
economic and technological challenges that may well lead to the
need to raise capital from nonlawyers.

287 In 1987, the FTC argued that rules limiting lawyers and nonlawyers to join
the same firm were incompatible with antitrust policy and sent letters urging
courts and bar committees to change their rules. See Andrews, supra note 58, at
620 ("[T]he FTC has taken the position that the lawyer ethics rules prohibiting
lawyers from forming legal services firms with nonlawyers should be
abolished.").
288 See Karmel, supra note 275, at 159-60, 196-97 (detailing that in response to
certain financial climate changes, the SEC has increased greater power over
SROs).
289 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.100-205.7 (1995).
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